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A Critical Analysis of the Registration
Provisions of the Minnesota Securities Act
Lawrence Perlman*
This article explores the registration provisions of the Min-
nesota Securities Act,1 proceeding on the thesis that such pro-
visions in particular and the Act in general are in need of a
substantial overhaul. Included is a brief introduction to the
Minnesota Act and to state and federal securities regulation
generally, followed by a detailed analysis of the registration
provisions of the Act.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Securities Act was enacted in 19172 after the
United States Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality
of the Blue Sky laws of several other states.3 It was one of a
wave of Blue Sky laws which followed the enactment by Kan-
sas of a comprehensive statute in 1911 regulating the sale of
securities and the securities business.4
The philosophy underlying these early Blue Sky laws was
similar to that which had led previously to the state regulation
of public utilities,5 and is summarized by one contemporary ob-
server:
The general purpose of these laws [the 19 state Blue Sky stat-
utes which had been passed between 1911 and 1913] is to force
those who intend to offer stocks and bonds to the public to
make known to some proper state authority their organization,
* Mr. Perlman is a partner in the firm of Fredrikson, Byron,
Colborn, Bisbee, Hansen & Perlman, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. Mnw. STAT. §§ 80.01-80.37 (1969). No official name is given
in the statute which is generally known as the Securities Act or the
Blue Sky law. In this article it will be generally referred to as "the
Act," or "the Minnesota act."
2. Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 429.
3. The so-called "Blue Sky cases" include Hall v. Geiger-Jones
Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917) (Ohio statute); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559 (1917) (South Dakota statute), Merrick v.
Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (Michigan statute).
4. Kansas Laws 1911, ch. 133. For the historical development of
Blue Sky laws see L. Loss & E. Cow-rT, BLuE SKY LAW 1-13 (1958)
and 1 L. Loss, SEcuarnas REGULATiON 23-30 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969).
5. See Ayres, Government Regulation of Securities Issues, 28 PoL.
ScL Q. 586 (1913).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
plan of business and the purpose for which the income from the
securities will be used. If this official does not believe that the
project offers a fair opportunity to the investor he may forbid
the proposed sale.6
The Minnesota act met an early test in Gutterson v. Pear-
son,7 when the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to apply it to
non-issuer transactions.8 The Minnesota legislature, however,
soon rallied to the protection of investors exposed by the Pear-
son decision to the mercy of the "unscrupulous and visionary,"
and amended the Act in 1923 to bring nonissuers within its pur-
view. 10
Apart from this skirmish over nonissuer coverage, the Act
and its early administration followed the pattern set under the
Kansas Act. The evil sought to be remedied was the loss suf-
fered by the public through investing in worthless enter-
prises.11 The regulatory technique chosen was to require deal-
6. Id.
7. 152 Minn. 482, 189 N.W. 458 (1922).
8. This decision presumably caused the State Securities Com-
mission some embarrassment since it had regulated nonissuer transac-
tions from the inception of the Act. Brown, A Review of Cases on
"Blue Sky" Legislation, 7 MImN. L. REv. 431, 437 (1923).
9. Id.
10. Minn. Laws 1923, ch. 4.
11. The conditions which those who administered the Act felt ex-
isted at the time of its passage included:
(1) Numerous promotions were in progress in which commis-
sions and other expenses incidental to the sale of the stock
amounted to thirty, forty, or fifty per cent, and even more, of
the selling price of the stock.(2) Mining and oil companies and various other fictitious
enterprises were selling stock to secure money with which to
develop properties not worth developing.
(3) Many stocks and other kinds of securities were sold at
grossly excessive prices and without regard to their actual
value.(4) Men with "ideas" formed companies and took fifty-one
per cent of the stock for their "ideas," the other forty-nine
being sold to finance the project. Very often the "ideas" proved
mere dreams and valueless, and only served to swell the sum
total of business failures and the number of stock purchasing
victims.
(5) Companies were formed to manufacture or exploit pat-
ented appliances, articles and devices which were mechanically
imperfect or impracticable.
(6) There was no one to question the propriety or legality
of the issuance of large blocks of stocks for "goodwill" or
other similar intangible assets, and it was not uncommon to
find new concerns whose only asset consisted of "goodwill."
(7) Stocks of concerns which were insolvent could be legally
offered and sold, subject only to the restrictions against ac-
tual fraud.
(8) Grossly excessive valuations were claimed for assets in
order to justify a given price for the stock or to cover up
losses in operation or other impairments.
[Vol. 56:523
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erse2 and persons desiring to sell securities issued by them-
selves (called "Investment Companies" in the early versions of
the Act) to apply for registration with the Securities Com-
mission.' 3 The Commission then granted or denied the appli-
cation or carried out further investigation.
The Act embodied the same paternalism found in most of
the Blue Sky laws of the time.1 4 The standard for registration
apparently applied by the early Securities Commission was a
particularly rigorous one:
The Commission has interpreted the laws to mean that the sale
of a security must be classed as fraudulent where the purchaser
thereof does not have a fair chance to gain by the investment.
It is not sufficient that the money invested be secure against
loss; there must be a fair chance to gain .... A man engaged
in business... may desire to sell stock to increase his business
or for other reasons. The commission, in such case, wants to
know all about the business, its past experiences, present condi-
tion, and future prospects. The commission obtains this infor-
mation. The purpose ... is to place before the commission the
facts in a particular case, so that the commission may determine
that the investor in the securities offered may not only not
lose what he puts in but have a fair chance to make a reason-
able profit on the investment. If the commission can not so
determine, it refuses to permit the securities to be sold, for to
sell the same would work a fraud on the investor.15
(9) Enterprises which were impossible of success were being
promoted.(10) Foreign corporations which had no offices or places of
business or permanent representative within a state sent their
glib-tongued agents therein to sell their stocks and securities,
and were often successful to a remarkable degree. If an in-
vestor found that he had been defrauded by false and
fraudulent representations, he was compelled to seek redress
in some foreign jurisdiction, or submit to his loss without com-
plaint.(11) Deliberately planned frauds were common and often
very remunerative to the promoters.
Brown, The Minnesota "Blue Sky" Law, 3 MmNn. L Rsv. 149, 149-50
(1919) (the author was one of the first members of the Minnesota Se-
curities Commission).
12. Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 429, § 4.
13. Id. at§§ 3&4.
14. An example is an early opinion of the Minnesota Supreme
Court construing the Act, in which the court said:
The [Securities] Commission is better qualified than the
average investor to ascertain whether any real values lie behind
mere paper evidences of value. It has power ... to compel a
full disclosure of the facts upon which to base an intelligentjudgment. Schemes devised to get the money of prospective
investors are innumerable. Many of them, though not fraudu-
lent are unsound or visionary.
State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 55, 177 N.W. 937, 938
(1920). See also Kerst v. Nelson, 171 Minn. 191, 213 N.W. 904, 905
(1927) (referring to the "paternalistic character" of Blue Sky laws).
15. Brown, supra note 11, at 159-60.
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While it has been amended many times, the Minnesota act
preserves the basic registration structure it contained when first
enacted. Unless an exemption applies or the issuer qualifies
for a seasoned security registration, the issuer must file an
application for registration, which the Commissioner of Securities
may deny
if [he] is of the opinion that the securities are fraudulent, or if
it appears to [him] that the sale thereof would work a fraud
or deception on the purchasers thereof, or if the proposed plan
of business of the issuer and the terms of the securities are
unfair and unjust, or if the applicant has violated any of the
provisions [of the Act relating to exemption or registration] or
any registration or lawful order of the [Commerce] commission
or for good cause appearing to the "Commissioner."'
The approach of the Minnesota act and the Blue Sky laws of
many other states in protecting securities purchasers stands in
sharp contrast to the federal regulatory scheme. Pursuant to
Section 80.08 of the Minnesota act, the State Commissioner of
Securities must determine whether the terms of the proposed
securities issue would be unfair and unjust. The federal Secur-
ities and Exchange Commission (SEC), on the other hand, is
granted no such authority to pass upon the merits of a securities
issue. Instead it focuses on the thoroughness and accuracy of
the prospectus supplied to the potential securities purchaser.
Section 5, the key provision of the federal Securities Act of
1933, makes it unlawful for any person to use the mails or any
means of interstate commerce to sell a security for which a reg-
istration statement (of which the prospectus is the main part)
is not in effect.17 Sections 11, 12 and 17 of the 1933 Act impose
civil and criminal liabilities on those who fail to comply with
its registration provisions or who utilize a registration statement
containing an untrue statement of a material fact or omitting
16. MNN. STAT. § 80.08 (1969). MNN. STAT. § 80.01(8) (which
was adopted in 1969 as part of a comprehensive amendment relating to
the Commerce Commission, Minn. Laws 1969, ch. 1129) provides that
"whenever necessary to give effect to such provision, the term 'com-
mission' may be construed as meaning or including [the] commissioner
of securities .... " In an amendment made in 1925, a Commissioner of
Securities was provided for who succeeded to the responsibilities dis-
charged by the Securities Commission under § 4 of the 1917 statute.
Minn. Laws 1925, ch. 426, art. VIII, § 3. The same amendment created
the Commerce Commission, consisting of the Commissioners of the In-
surance, Banking and Securities Divisions. [The Securities Division is
referred to as "the Division" in this paper].
17. Securities Act of 1933, § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77(e) (1970) [here-
inafter called "the 1933 Act"]. The 1933 Act is introduced thoroughly
and concisely in E. THOMAs, FEDERAL SECuinES ACT HANDBOOK (3d ed.
1969).
[Vol. 56:523
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a material fact.' S In addition, the SEC has injunctive powers.0
This pattern of private and governmental enforcement supports
the basic thrust of the 1933 Act, which is to require the seller of
securities to make full disclosure on which prospective securi-
ties purchasers may base decisions. Securities purchasers are
to be protected by their informed judgment and not by the sub-
stituted judgment of a government administrator. 0
Some type of Blue Sky law is presently in effect in every
American jurisdiction, except Delaware and the Virgin Islands.
While the general registration pattern of the Minnesota act is
similar to that found in many other states, there is by no means
uniformity among the Blue Sky laws of the various states.
Instead, one finds a bewildering diversity. Not only are there
significant substantive differences among the various statutes,
but otherwise similar provisions are often interpreted and ad-
ministered differently by the various Blue Sky administrators.2 1
The various Blue Sky laws may be divided into four general
categories:
18. Securities Act of 1933, §§ 11, 12, 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k), (1),
& (q) (1970).
19. Securities Act of 1933, § 20b, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1970).
20. "The fundamental aim of the prospectus requirement was to
provide information, and not to shield the public from ventures deemed
to be of dubious merit." CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 49 (1969), quoting
SECURTES EXCHANGE CosVsMIsSION, DisCLOSURE TO INvEsToRs: A RE-
APPRAISAL OF FEDERAL ADINisTRATVE PoLIcIEs UNDER THE '33 AD '34
AcTs, [hereinafter called the "Wheat Report"). The Wheat Report is a
thorough examination of the disclosure philosophy underlying the 1933
Act. For further discussions of the 1933 Act and of its place in the pat-
tern of federal securities regulation see Cohen, "Truth in Securities"
Revisited, 79 HAnv. L. REv. 1340 (1966); Knauss, A Reappraisal of the
Role of Disclosure, 62 MIcH. L. REv. 607 (1964).
A consumer's eye view of the SEC disclosure philosophy was ex-
pressed by one David F. Friedman of Hollywood, California, a pro-
ducer of adult films, who was quoted by Minneapolis Tribune columnist,
Will Jones:
rm going public. My prospectus is going to be a dazzling
work, offering not mere fortune but the chance to meet pretty
girls. Every stockholder will be issued a permanent pass to
the studio. In order to sell stock, the SEC requires only that
you be truthful in the prospectus, and that's exactly what rm
going to be. One of my competitors recently went public and
the only assets he listed were the time and talents of himself,
and he ended up with two and a half million dollars. I can
make a better showing than that in the prospectus, and to
show you how serious I am, rve already taken an option on a
place in Tahiti.
The Minneapolis Tribune, Oct. 2, 1971, § A at 10, col. 1.
21. See L. Loss & E. CowLrr, supra note 4, at 44. Writing in 1958
when there were 47 Blue Sky laws in effect, Loss and Cowett estimated
that there were 2,800 exemptions from registration in such statutes.
Id. at 19.
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1. Fraud: laws providing for criminal and civil sanctions for
fraudulently offering or selling securities but not requiring regis-
tration of securities or dealers;
2. Broker-Dealer Regulation: laws regulating broker-dealers
but not requiring the registration of securities;
3. Intrastate Only: laws not requiring registration of securi-
ties registered or exempt from registration under the 1933 Act,
except that securities exempt from 1933 Act registration pur-
suant to Section 3 (a) (11) (intrastate exemption) must be regis-
tered;
4. Merit: laws requiring the registration of securities and
broker-dealers and granting the administrator the power to deny
registration on merit grounds.
No jurisdiction presently relies solely on a fraud type stat-
ute,22 and Connecticut and Maine regulate only broker-dealers. 23
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania fall into
the intrastate only category, although New Jersey, New York,
and Pennsylvania are broker-dealer regulation states for of-
ferings registered with the SEC.24  All remaining states fall
into the merit category, although most of these have general an-
tifraud provisions, as does Minnesota, 25 as well as provisions re-
lating to broker-dealer registration.
The standards applied by the various merit states in deter-
mining whether to allow a security to be registered vary great-
ly.2 6 Prior to 1956, there was even less uniformity than pres-
22. 1 BLuE SKY L. REP. f 503.
23. CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. §§ 36-320 to 36-347 (1962). (Prior to
1967, Connecticut required that oil and mining securities be registered);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 32, §§ 751-856 (1964). The District of Colum-
bia's Blue Sky law (D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-2401 et seq. (1967) ) regulates
only broker-dealers, but the 1933 Act is applicable to the District
because it defines "interstate commerce" in § 2(7) as including "trade
or commerce. . . within the District of Columbia."
24. NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.075 (1967); N.J. REV. STAT. § 49.3-60
(Supp. 1968); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-ff (McKinney Supp. 1968);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 43(c) (1965). Of these four states, two apply
merit tests to securities which fall within the scope of their registration
requirements. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 43(g) (1965) ("fraudulent"
sales may be forbidden by the Commissioner); NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 90.140,
90.155 (1965) (regulation of selling costs and organizers minimum
equity investment).
25. MINN. STAT. § 80.19 (1969).
26. See notes 21-22 supra, and accompanying text. L. Loss & E.
CowETT, supra note 4, discusses the varying standards and practices in
chapters I-III. See also Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the
Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1447, 1451-78 (1969); Hueni,
Application of Merit Requirements in State Securities Regulation, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 1417 (1969). The approaches of the various states to
nonissuer transactions are covered in Note, Nonissuer Transactions
Under Federal and State Securities Registration Laws, 78 HAnv. L. REV.
1635, 1643-50 (1965).
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ently exists, and it was this "pointless complexity" in an area
of the law where "uniformity is so essential" which formed the
background for the drafting of the Uniform Securities Act and
its approval by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association."
The Uniform Act consists of four parts and two principal
appendices. Part I describes "fraudulent and other prohib-
ited practices"; Part II pertains to registration of broker-deal-
ers, agents, and investment advisors; Part DI provides for
securities registration; and Part IV contains exemptions and
various general provisions. The two appendices enable the Uni-
form Act to be tailored to a particular jurisdiction's desires by
describing the modifications necessary to eliminate the securi-
ties registration provisions (Part EIl) or the broker-dealer reg-
istration provisions (Part H), or both. Although a testament
to the ingenuity of its draftsmen, the adaptability of the Uni-
form Act's structure undercuts the very uniformity which was
its original objective. While it has been adopted in whole or in
part in 27 jurisdictions,2 8 many states have tinkered with it
substantially enough in the process that there is in fact no real
uniformity.
This lack of uniformity among Blue Sky laws is further re-
flected in the variety of regulations which have been adopted
under such statutes. This nonuniformity of regulations has
caused the various groups of securities administrators and, par-
ticularly, the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, to
attempt to develop consistent standards for implementation of
their respective disparate merit statutes through the promulga-
tion of standardized regulations.
Through its approval of various uniform forms and its
statements of policy on real estate investment trusts, cheap
stock, preferred stock, options and warrants, and other matters,
the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association has had a sig-
nificant impact on the regulations adopted in its member
states.2 9 Recently a group called the Central Securities Ad-
27. See L. Loss & E. CowET=, supra note 4, at 230-44, for a history
and description of the Uniform Act. The Uniform Act is contained in 1
BLuE SKY L. Rzp. ff f 4901-53.
28. Included are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michi-
gan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4901.
29. Member states of the Midwest Securities Commissioners As-
19721
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ministrators Council, consisting of the states of Indiana, Michi-
gan, Minnesota, Missouri, and Wisconsin (apparently with
moral support from Ohio which is currently revising its Blue
Sky law) has been formed, and on August 31, 1971 it adopted a
comprehensive Statement of Policy on Broker-Dealers' Capi-
tal, Investment Companies, and Oil and Gas Interests.3" This
group has as one of its objectives the development of proced-
ures of sufficient similarity that the registration of an issue in
any member state will serve as virtual clearance in all.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE MINNESOTA
REGULATORY SCHEME
A. ScoPE OF ACT
The heart of the Minnesota Securities Act is found in Sec-
tion 80.07, which provides:
No securities, except those exempt under section 80.05 and
those sold in sales exempt under section 80.06, shall be offered
for sale or sold within the state unless such securities have been
registered pursuant to sections 80.08 or 80.09, except that it shall
be permissible for licensed broker-dealers and agents to offer
for sale in Minnesota prior to registration securities for which
a registration statement has been filed under the Federal Securi-
ties Act of 1933.
The statutory definition of a security is comprehensive,'
and the Minnesota Supreme Court has taken a broad view in
this regard, resulting in a consistent expanding of the coverage
of the Act.32 Thus unless the subject of the sale is not a security,
sociation are Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wash-
ington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
30. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4851.
31. "Security" means and includes any stock, share, bond, note,
debenture, commercial paper, evidence of indebtedness, in-
vestment contract, interest in or under a profit-sharing or par-
ticipating agreement or scheme, or beneficial interest in a trust
or pretended trust. Any interest in any security shall be
deemed a security. "Security" does not include any insurance
or endowment policy, annuity contract or contract on a variable
basis issued by a life insurance company holding a current
certificate of authority authorizing it to do an insurance busi-
ness in this state.
Mn, n . STAT. § 80.01 (4) (1969).
32. See, e.g., Donovan v. Dixon, 261 Minn. 455, 113 N.W.2d 432
(1962) (guaranty fund certificates issued by mutual insurance com-
pany are securities); Virnig v. Smith, 252 Minn. 363, 90 N.W.2d 241
(1958) (joint venture interests are securities); State v. Lorentz, 221
Minn. 366, 22 N.W.2d 313 (1946) (contracts for burial lots are securi-
ties); State v. Golden, 216 Minn. 97, 12 N.W.2d 617 (1943) (oil interests
[Vol. 56:523
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or an exemption is available, or the sale is not deemed to be a
Minnesota sale,33 registration under the Act is required.
B. REGISTRATION PROVISIONS FOR ISSUER TRANSACTIONS
1. Registration by Application-Coordination of State and Fed-
eral Filings
Section 80.0834 covers registration by application, which is
are securities); State v. Hofacre, 206 Minn. 167, 288 N.W. 13 (1939)
(interest in discretionary investment account a security); State v. Rob-
bins, 185 Minn. 202, 240 N.W. 456 (1932) (fur farm profit sharing con-
tracts are securities); State v. Code, 178 Minn. 492, 227 N.W. 652 (1929)
(interests in invention being developed are securities); Webster v. U.S.L
Realty Co., 170 MVinn. 360, 212 N.W. 806 (1927) (land contracts with
options are investment contracts); Kerst v. Nelson, 171 Minn. 191, 213
N.W. 904 (1927) (land contracts by which seller agreed to cultivate and
market crops and share proceeds with purchaser are securities); State
v. Swenson, 172 MAinn. 277, 215 N.W. 177 (1927) (interest in invention a
security); State v. Bushard, 164 Minn. 455, 205 N.W. 370 (1925) (con-
tract for sale of bus with profit sharing arrangement a security);
State v. Ogden, 154 Minn. 425, 191 N.W. 916 (1923) (profit sharing
contract a security); State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 191 N.W. 425 (1922)
(contract which included option to purchase real estate a security);
State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W. 937 (1920)
(investment contract a security). But see Bates v. Equitable Life
Assur. Soc. of United States, 206 Minn. 482, 288 N.W. 834 (1939) (an-
nuity contract held not to be a security); Busch v. Noerenberg, 202
Minn. 290, 278 N.W. 34 (1938) (unless incident to an interest in profits
from tract, contract for undivided interest in land not security).
33. For discussions of the conflict of laws problem in state securi-
ties transactions see L. Loss & E. Cow=TT, supra note 4, at ch. 5; Fried-
man, Searching for a Blue Sky Remedy-A Forum Shopper's Guide,
15 WAYNE L. Rmv. 1495 (1969).
34. The section states:
Applications for registration of securities shall be made on
forms prescribed by the commission. The application shall
contain such information and representations as the commis-
sion may require as necessary or appropriate in the public in-
terest or for the protection of investors.
When the commissioner deems it necessary he shall have
power, in connection with pending applications and at the ex-
pense of the applicant, to require the applicant to furnish addi-
tional information, to order an appraisal, audit or other exami-
nation and report, and, where the applicant is the issuer of the
securities, or the proposed sale is to be on behalf of the issuer,
to make an investigation of the books, records, property, busi-
ness, and affairs of such issuer.
Upon compliance with all the provisions of sections 80.05
to 80.27 applicable to such application and the requirements of
the commission or commissioner, the commission shall either
register such securities or deny the application. The commis-
sion shall have power to place such conditions, limitations,
and restrictions on any registration as may be necessary to
carry out the purposes of sections 80.05 to 80.27. Registration
shall be by entry in a book called Register of Securities, which
entry shall show the securities registered and for whom
1972]
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the procedure to be followed for all registrations except the rela-
tively few involving "seasoned securities" which are covered
by Section 80.09.35 Mechanically, the procedure for registra-
tion by application under the Act will vary depending on whether
or not the securities are also being registered under the Federal
Securities Act of 1933 or offered pursuant to a Regulation A
exemption from such registration. In the absence of a federal
registration or Regulation A exemption, the Minnesota applica-
tion form and required exhibits must be filed.30
The Minnesota Securities Commission regulations provide
that in lieu of the material required to be filed thereunder, the
Uniform Application to Register Securities and the registration
statement filed with the SEC may be used for registration in
Minnesota of securities concurrently being registered with the
SEC.3 7 The adoption of the Uniform Application was a major
step in reducing to reasonable proportions the task of registering
a nationwide distribution of securities, but a serious mechani-
cal problem still remains in the Act because no provision is made
for coordination of federal and Minnesota registrations. One
of the accomplishments of the Uniform Act is that its "registra-
tion by coordination" provisions allow for simultaneous federal
and state effectiveness of registrations. "
registered, and the conditions, limitations, and restrictions, if
any, or shall make proper reference to a formal order of the
commission on file showing such conditions, limitations, and re-
strictions. The commission shall have power to deny an appli-
cation for registration if the commission is of the opinion that
the securities are fraudulent, or if it appears to the commis-
sion that the sale thereof would work a fraud or deception on
the purchasers thereof, or if the proposed plan of business of
the issuer and the terms of the securities are unfair and unjust,
or if the applicant has violated any of the provisions of sec-
tions 80.05 to 80.27 or any registration or lawful order of the
commission, or for good cause appearing to the commission.
Denial shall be by written order.
MI N. STAT. § 80.08 (1969).
35. See part II B 3 infra.
36. Regs. S. Div. 2-4. [The Rules and Regulations of the Securities
Division of the Minnesota Department of Commerce as filed with the
Secretary of State and Commissioner of Administration on July 8, 1970,
are cited hereinafter as "Regs. S. Div." and referred to as the "regula-
tions" or as the "Minnesota regulations."]
37. Regs. S. Div. 3. The Uniform Application was prepared by the
Committee on State Regulation of Securities of the Section of Corpora-
tion, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar Association and
approved for use in Minnesota as of October 1, 1962. 1 BLUE SxY L.
REP. f 4471-72. For the form itself see id. at 1 4473.
38. UNIFORM SEcuRiTIEs ACT § 303 (C). In addition to the Uni-
form Act jurisdictions, the California Corporate Securities Act of 1968
contains a registration by coordination procedure in § 25111 (c) which is
[Vol. 56:523
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The problem of coordinating federal and state registrations
derives from the manner in which registrations are treated by
the SEC and securities underwriters. While Section 8 of the
1933 Act provides that registration statements automatically be-
come effective 20 days after they are filed (unless a stop-order
procedure is initiated), the normal practice is to file a delaying
amendment along with the initial registration statement which,
under Rule 473,39 delays the effective date until (i) a further
amendment is filed which states that the registration statement
shall become effective in accordance with Section 8(a), or
(ii) the SEC accelerates the effective date. This procedure is
chosen because registrants do not wish to allow registration
statements to become effective until after they have received
and complied with the SEC letters of comment which spell out
deficiencies in the registration statements. When the comments
have been satisfied through the preparation and filing of one or
more amendments, normally a desired effective date will be se-
lected. The SEC is then asked to accelerate the registration
statement's effectiveness to such date. In an underwritten regis-
tration where there is a pre-existing public market for the secur-
ities to be offered, the price at which the securities are to be
offered will not generally be determined until after the market
has closed on the day before the effective date, and the under-
writer will not sign the underwriting agreement (which com-
mits it to purchase the securities) until the afternoon of that
day or until the morning of the effective date itself. When the
price is agreed upon and the underwriting agreement signed,
the final amendment (called the "price amendment") is filed
with the SEC, usually on the effective date. Even if there is no
pre-existing public market, the underwriter will generally not
sign'the underwriting agreement until the afternoon before or
the day of SEC effectiveness. 40
adapted from UNIFoRm SEcuRIEs AcT § 303(c). CAL. CoRP. CoDE
§ 25111 (West Supp. 1970). Texas has also adopted such a procedure.
T= REv. Civ. STAT. art. 581-7 Cc) (1964) (also based on UsiroRMu
SEcuRrs AcT § 303 (c) ).
39. For discussion relating to Rule 473 of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1933, see H. SowARDs, FEDERAL SEcURITIES AcT, ch. 7, (11 BusINmsS
ORGANIZATIONS, 1971 Rev.).
• 40. Underwriters follow this policy not only to minimize the risk of
a market break or some other problem occurring between their com-
mitment under the underwriting agreement and the effective date of
the registration statement, but because Rule 15c3-1 (c) (2) (E) under
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 comes into effect when they sign
the underwriting agreement to require a deduction from the under-
writer's net capital of a portion of the value of the securities to which
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Compliance with SEC procedures and with the customs of
securities underwriters requires a substantial amount of coordi-
nation among SEC staff members, underwriters, lawyers for the
registrant and underwriters, accountants and Blue Sky adminis-
trators. Because timing decisions are often made on short no-
tice, the problem of making a sizeable registration effective with
the SEC as well as a number of states on the same day can be
a logistical nightmare. Section 303(c) of the Uniform Act ap-
proaches the problem by declaring that the registration state-
ment filed with the state becomes effective automatically when
it becomes effective with the SEC if three conditions are met:
1. No state stop order is in effect and no denial, suspension
or revocation proceedings are pending;
2. The registration statement has been on file for at least
10 days (a period designed to give the administrator an
opportunity to apply the state's merit requirements to the
offering) ;
3. A statement of the maximum and minimum proposed
offering prices and the maximum underwriting commissions
have been on file with the state for two days (this procedure
obviates the filing of the SEC price amendment with the
state prior to effectiveness, which is difficult because of the
short intervals between determination of the price and SEC
effectiveness [usually less than 24 hours] and the filing of
the price amendment and SEC effectiveness [sometimes only
one or two hours]).
Since the Minnesota act has no such coordination provi-
sions, various Minnesota Securities Commissioners have tried
to assist issuers by informal procedures aimed at making regis-
tration in Minnesota effective upon SEC effectiveness if the is-
sue meets the appropriate merit standards. Nevertheless, these
informal procedures often have not worked satisfactorily and
impose a burden on the Security Division's staff. The absence
of a clear coordination procedure must be deemed a serious de-
fect in the Minnesota Act.
2. Standards
The standards which the state Commissioner of Securities
is to apply in determining whether or not to grant an applica-
the underwriter is committed to purchase. A thorough discussion of the
SEC registration procedure will be found in H. SOWARDS, supra note 39,
at ch. 7.
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tion for registration are set out in the third paragraph of Sec-
tion 80.08 of the Act.41 These statutory standards are quite gen-
eral, and the Securities Commission has, from time to time, en-
acted regulations to implement them. 42  The current regula-
tions, adopted in 1970, fall into six categories concerning rights
of security holders, selling expenses, options and warrants, of-
fering price, minimum investment, and speculative issues.43 Fi-
nancial statement requirements, while technically separate from
the standards regulations, are closely related and will also be
considered under this heading.
a. Rights of Security Holders.
Eight regulations44 cover voting rights of common and pre-
ferred stock, protective provisions for preferred shares, debt
securities and trust indentures, convertible senior securities, as-
sessments and restrictions on transfer. In structure and, to a
large degree, in substantive content, the regulations are based
on Subarticle 1 of Article 4 of the regulations adopted under the
California Corporate Securities Law of 1968.5 The regulation
dealing with voting rights of common stock" is taken from a
Statement of Policy adopted by the Midwest Securities Com-
missioners Association on June 27, 1968, 47 which has been
adopted by several states.48
The regulations relating to rights of security holders are part
of the difficult problem of reconciling state securities regulation
with general corporate law. The rights of a corporation's secur-
ity holders are governed generally by the corporation statute
under which the corporation was formed, as supplemented and
limited by the articles of incorporation, bylaws, and certain
41. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
42. A complete revision of these regulations was adopted in 1970,
and is contained in chapter 3 of the regulations. The closely related
regulations pertaining to conditions of registration are found in chap-
ter 4.
43. For a critique of the standards regulations as originally pro-
posed see MAcINrosH, PERLMAN, JOHNSON, HALE & DoLAN, MEm-
oRANDUm: CoamwENrs OF THE SECURITIES REGULATION SECTION, HENNE-
PIN CouNTy BAR ASSOCIATION, ON PROPOSED RULES OF THE MINNESOTA
COaMMISSIONER OF SECURITIES (1970) [hereinafter cited as '"1EouA-
DUM'"].
44. Regs. S. Div. 212-19.
45. Cal. Regs. 260.140.1 to .10; 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 8617.
46. Regs. S. Div. 212.
47. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. q 4761.
48. E.g., -Kansas Regs. 81-7-1(K), id. at 19,707; Wis. Regs. 3.07,
id. at Y 52,603.
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other instruments (e.g., the certificate relating to the terms
of a preferred stock issue called for by Section 301.14(5) of the
Minnesota Business Corporation Act). Such rights normally
are not the subject of regulation by states other than the state
of incorporation, even though the state in which a security
holder resides may have a more rigorous corporation statute.
For example, provisions relating to indemnification of di-
rectors, cumulative voting, proxy solicitations, percentage of
shareholder vote required on certain corporate action, and rights
of preferred shareholders vary widely from state to state. While
it has been argued that states with more rigorous corporation
laws should effect the public policy expressed by such statutes
through enforcement of the state's Blue Sky and foreign cor-
poration qualification laws,4 9 not only federal constitutional
considerations but concern about the impact of such an approach
on interstate commerce seems so far to have suppressed such
regional excesses. 50
Certain of Minnesota's regulations relating to the rights
of security holders bite deeply into areas traditionally the
province of state corporation law. Regulations 213 and 214 pre-
scribe detailed preferred stock provisions, and regulation 217
calls for "an appropriate antidilution provision" in convertible
senior securities. This presents a question of what standards
the Commissioner should apply in determining the accepta-
bility of preferred stock provisions or the appropriateness of pre-
ferred stock terms.51
The problems created by wholesale adoption of another
state's regulations are demonstrated by regulation 219 which
provides in part that "No application .. .will be approved to
49. Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corporate Policy, 21
VAND. L. REV. 433 (1968).
50. Perhaps the furthest judicial extension of this doctrine to date
is found in Western Airlines v. Sobieski, 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 719 (1961), where the court ruled that the California Commissioner
of Corporations had jurisdiction over a change in the rights of out-
standing shares of a Delaware corporation. California has since re-
versed its position on the substantive issue involved in the Western
Airlines case by no longer requiring the presence of cumulative voting
as a prerequisite to a finding of fairness in connection with the regis-
tration of securities of a non-California corporation. Cal. Regs. 260.140.1.
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. ff 8617.
51. On October 6, 1968 the Midwest Securities Commissioners
Association adopted a Statement of Policy on Preferred Stock and Deben-
tures which, to varying degrees, seems to be followed in Minnesota. 1
BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 4791.
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issue securities, the transfer of which is subject to any restric-
tions imposed by the charter documents of the issuer or the in-
denture or other instrument pursuant to which the securities are
issued." (Emphasis added). Such a regulation appears clearly
reasonable since investor liquidity would be restricted by
the resulting lack of a public market if the securities were
subject to transfer restrictions. On the other hand, private agree-
ments among shareholders are an important element in many
business transactions, are viewed sympathetically in Minnesota, -
and presumably should not be subject to the Commissioner's re-
view except in extraordinary circumstances. The California
regulation, 2 of which regulation 219 is a copy, protects against
such interference with private contracts because the term
"charter documents" is defined elsewhere54 to include items
such as articles, bylaws, and the like. Since the phrase is not a
term of art in the Minnesota regulations (or in the Minnesota
Business Corporation Act where the word "charter" is not
used), ambiguity is imported into the regulations along with
the spectre of the Commissioner asserting jurisdiction over
private agreements. The same type of problem is presented
by another portion of Regulation 219 which states that "limited
offering qualifications may be approved for the issuance of secur-
ities subject to such restrictions" (on transfer) subject to review
by the Commission. (Emphasis added). The concept of "lim-
ited offering qualifications" is again taken verbatim from the
California regulation,5 5 but it is alien to the Minnesota act and
to the Minnesota regulations. Since the Act covers many se-
curities transactions involving corporations which are not com-
monly considered public corporations, and since it is often
good corporate practice to include transfer restrictions for such
closely held corporations not only in shareholder agreements
but in articles of incorporation and corporate bylaws,50 the reg-
ulation could have wholly unintended effects.
b. Selling Expenses
The Minnesota regulation relating to selling expenses de-
fines selling expenses to include not only underwriting discounts
52. See Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946).
53. Cal. Eegs. 260.140.8, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 8617.
54. CaL Regs. 260.001(a), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 8613.
55. Cal. Regs. 260.001(e), 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 8613.
56. See generally 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORA T IONS: LA\w AND
PRAcTIcE (1971).
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or commissions, but the value of options or warrants granted to
underwriters or persons affiliated with them. Selling expenses
may not exceed 15 per cent of the dollar amount of the total
offering for "common stocks" and "oil or gas interests," and may
not exceed 10 per cent for all other securities.57
The provision of Regulation 230 relating to stock sold to
underwriters or persons affiliated with underwriters within
two years of the offering is one element of the regulation of
what, in the parlance of Blue Sky law, has come to be known
somewhat indelicately as "cheap stock." The Minnesota regu-
lation on cheap stock (Regulation 295) is more realistic than
the Midwest Commissioners' Policy"8 because it recognizes that
the unfair opportunity for profit at the expense of the public,
which is the reason for regulation of cheap stock, is usually a
direct function of when the stock was issued. Under Regula-
tion 295, securities issued between two and three years prior to
the public offering may have been sold for as little as one-third
of the public offering price before they will be deemed cheap
stock, while securities sold within one year of the public offer-
ing will be deemed cheap stock unless their sale price was at
least two-thirds of the public offering price. As it appears in
regulation 230, in connection with selling expenses, the cheap
stock concept differs sharply from its expression in Regulation
295. Not only are all sales within a two-year period indis-
criminately lumped together with no relative price factor built
in, but the Commissioner may deem the price differential an
underwriting commission if he considers such sales "to have been
in lieu of commissions, or material in the selection of an under-
writer ... or otherwise indirectly connected with the offer-
ing .. .
An underwriter who makes an equity investment in a com-
pany within two years before a public offering would be a very
likely choice of that company to be its underwriter on grounds
of loyalty if not business judgment. And such investment would
57. At least 25 other states regulate the amount of underwriting
commission and selling expenses. In any such state the maximum
allowed is 20 per cent, consisting of a 15 per cent commission and 5 per
cent selling expenses. Bloomenthal, supra note 26, at nn. 129-36. Limi-
tations on commissions are only a part of a pattern of Blue Sky regula-
tion of underwriter's compensation which includes cheap stock and op-
tion limitations along with regulation of the selling price itself.
58. Statement of Policy on Cheap Stock, adopted June 27, 1968.
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4761.
59. Regs. S. Div. 230.
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surely be "indirectly connected" with the offering even if it
served no more important function than keeping the company
alive to the point where an underwriting was possible. But
why should an underwriter be penalized, in effect, for such an
investment? On the contrary, perhaps underwriters should be
encouraged to make such investments since they are presumably
better able to speculate than public investors who would bene-
fit from the underwriter's "front money" on successful invest-
ments and be pirotected from loss on those that are less success-
ful. The rationale for treating the sale of cheap stock to under-
writers as part of the underwriting commission when found to
be in lieu of commissions on the prior placement 0 seems dif-
ferent from the considerations which apply if the cheap stock
is not considered to be in lieu of commissions. By scrambling
several concepts together which have no logical or realistic con-
nection (e.g., materiality in underwriter selection and direct
or indirect connection with offering), the regulation ends up
operating arbitrarily and unfairly.
The exclusion of charges of "auditors, accountants, engin-
eers, appraisers, and other experts" from the selling expense
category raises the question of whether the charges of such per-
sons would be excluded if hired by the underwriter. The only
underwriter's agents specifically mentioned are attorneys, and
their fees are included. It would seem desirable to encourage
underwriters to utilize accountants and engineers as investigat-
ors in connection with public offerings so that the investing
public would receive the protection afforded by such expert coun-
sel. If the regulation is to be read to include such items as
selling expenses when incurred for the benefit of the under-
writer, perhaps consideration should be given to the allowance of
a specified percentage over and above the selling expense per-
centage for accountable underwriter's investigative expenses.
In such a case at least some portion, if not all, of the under-
writer's lawyer's fees should be excluded from selling expenses
since the underwriter's lawyer generally plays a significant
investigative role in the offering.
60. An ambiguity lurks even in the language pertaining to com-
missions. Are the "commissions" those which will be paid in connec-
tion with the public offering or those which would have been paid in
connection with the prior placement involving the cheap stock itself?
If the latter is the case, why should the prior transaction (which pre-
sunably was not subject to the Commissioner's purview) be relevant
to the proposed public offering?
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c. Options and Warrants
Options and warrants consistently have been regulated by
Blue Sky administrators, and are covered by policy statements
of both the North American Securities Administrators (NASA)
and the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association (MSCA).01
The Minnesota regulations (241-48), while based on both the
NASA and MSCA Statements, generally show greater flexibil-
ity. Regulation is aimed at three specific groups of option or
warrant holders-employees, underwriters and lenders. There
is an overall limitation providing that "authorized warrants
and options to purchase shares . .. shall not be in excess of 15
per cent (15%) of the common shares to be outstanding if the en-
tire public offering is sold .... -62
The provisions of Regulation 242 present several problems.
While the limitation is presumably aimed at shares, it is ex-
pressed in terms of "authorized warrants and options to pur-
chase shares." A warrant or option will not necessarily be for
the purchase of one share of stock and, to the extent it is not, the
literal language of the regulation makes no sense, as it appears
to speak in terms of quantities of warrants rather than values of
warrants in terms of the number of shares they cover.03 The use
of the word "authorized" is also troublesome because it implies
that the warrants and options under consideration have some
status different from being issued. Options and warrants are
usually issued to their holders in the same manner as other cor-
porate securities.64  Does the regulation mean actually issued
warrants and options or does it mean warrants and options so
issued plus those reserved for issuance?
The confusion raised by the word "authorized" is com-
pounded when the 15 per cent numerical limitation is con-
sidered. The 15 per cent figure, with its uncertain composi-
tion, is applied against the shares to be outstanding if the of-
61. 1 BLuE SKY L. REP. 4577 (NASA), 4796 (MSCA).
62. Regs. S. Div. 242.
63. Compare the language of Regs. S. Div. 242, with the NASA's
language-"the number of shares covered by the options and warrants"
1 BLUE SKY L. REP. f 4577, 3(b)); and the MSCA's language-"the
number of shares represented by such options and warrants" Id. at 11
4796 (D).
64. See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. § 301.14(6) & (7) (1969). The regu-
lations do not define "warrants" or "options." While the terms are not
used with precision in practice, the term warrant is sometimes used to
describe the instrument evidencing the option or other right to pur-
chase shares. See C. ISRAELS, CoRPoRATE PRACTIc 55 (1968 ed).
[Vol. 56:523
MINNESOTA SECURITIES ACT
fering is sold. Exempted completely from this limitation are
options and warrants issued to purchasers as part of a pro rata
offering65 and exempted to the extent of 20 percent of the of-
fering are options, warrants and convertible debentures issued
in connection with financing arrangements. 0 The exception for
the latter group raises the question of whether the 20 per cent
figure is a mere 5 per cent expansion of Regulation 244's 15 per
cent limitation allowing an aggregate of 20 percent or a sepa-
rate exception for lenders resulting in a possible aggregate of
35 percent.
Employee options (whether qualified under Section 422 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or not) are limited by Reg-
ulation 245 to 10 per cent of "the then outstanding" shares of
the issuer. Presumably "then outstanding" refers to the num-
ber of shares outstanding prior to the offering, although it is
not clear why the number of shares under option to employees
should be computed on a less generous standard than that ap-
plying to lenders (Regulation 248 (g)'s 20 per cent test is com-
puted on a post-offering basis). Indeed, it is unclear why there
should be a limitation at all on the number of shares under
qualified options. Such options must be granted at fair market
value at date of issue and to be eligible to receive such options,
the recipient must be an employee who does not own stock,
including the option stock, equal to more than 5 per cent of the
voting power of the company (except that in companies where
the equity capital is less than two million dollars, the percent-
age may go as high as 10 per cent). 7 Given the percentage lim-
itation and the fair market value price requirement, it is un-
likely that a qualified stock option could be used by an insider
to take advantage of public shareholders. In any event, for a
new company an option may be the only means by which it
can attract highly skilled personnel from an older, well-estab-
lished company. The usually strict Midwest Securities Com-
missioners Association places no numerical limitations on em-
ployees options, requiring only that they be "reasonable in num-
ber and method of exercise."68 Again, by failing to distinguish
between options reserved for issuance but not issued and those
in fact issued,69 Regulation 245 further complicates the comp-
65. Regs. S. Div. 244.
66. Regs. S. Div. 248(g).
67. INT. Rsv. CoDE of 1954 § 422(b) (7).
68. 1 BLUE SKY L. RE'. 4796.
69. Under § 422(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1965, an
option plan must set out the aggregate number of shares which may be
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utation called for by Regulation 242. Options or warrants to un-
derwriters are limited to 5 per cent of the number of shares to
be sold (Regulation 246(g)), even though the underwriter takes
a correspondingly smaller cash commission and otherwise re-
mains within the percentage limitations of Regulation 230.
The regulations pertaining to options and warrants are not
only ambiguous and uneven in application,7" but regulate with
too heavy a hand the delicate areas of a corporation's relation-
ships with its lenders and employees. Except for warrants to un-
derwriters (which may not be very negotiable as a practical
matter), the decisions as to warrants and options may have been
made well before the public offering for what at the time
appeared to be sound business reasons. Even if the corporate
officers had Regulations 241-48 in mind, a term loan "in hand"
(with numerous warrants) may have seemed more prudent
than a public offering "in the bush." It is the small and rela-
tively new corporation that most needs to use warrants and op-
tions to obtain financing, to give incentives to employees (who
may take smaller salaries because of them) and to attract an un-
derwriter, yet it is the small and relatively new corporation
which is penalized when the time for a public offering comes.
The standard justification for stringent regulation of op-
tions and warrants was expressed by the Director of the Michi-
gan Securities Bureau in 1969:
Stock purchase options or warrants, entitling the holders to
purchase shares during a stated term at a fixed price or at
escalated prices, are a matter of concern because of potential
dilution of the equity of the existing and new shareholders ....
issued under option. Assume the number so reserved under a plan is
50,000, but the number of shares actually subject to issued options is
25,000. Which number of shares is "subject to such options" for the
purpose of regulation 245?
70. The discussion in the text is not exhaustive. A close analysis
of regulation 248(g) (iii), for example, raises the question of why re-
quire that "the product obtained by multiplying the number of shares
issuable [on exercise of a warrant or conversion of a debenture] by
the exercise or conversion price thereof" not exceed the face amount of
the loan? Assume a $100,000 loan and a warrant for the purchase of
50,000 shares at escalating exercise prices of $1, $2, $3, $4 and $5 over a
five-year term. Such terms would seem to the advantage of the com-
pany and yet may be barred by the requirements of the regulations.
Regulation 248(e) may restrict lenders from utilizing antidilution lan-
guage-which is part of their "boiler plate" and which they may well
not waive-to the disadvantage of Minnesota corporate borrowers.
Limiting underwriter's warrants to 5 per cent (Regs. S. Div. 246(g) )
may not be to the advantage of an issuer which would prefer to grant
more warrants and retain a larger portion of the cash obtained in
the offering.
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Their use is, in a sense, not an efficient way of raising capital
because they tend to be exercised when a company is prospering
and less in need of additional capital; and they tend not to be
exercised when a company is in difficulty, the market price of
its stock is depressed, and it could advantageously use new
funds. Substantial amounts of options and warrants outstand-
ing might prevent an issuer from obtaining the best terms in
marketing subsequent securities offerings.71
corporate officer's response might well be that whether op-
tions are an efficient way of raising capital is quite beside the
point; they often may be the only way. That warrants and op-
tions are an essential financing tool for many small businesses
is recognized in a back-handed way by Regulation 246(d) which
requires that a corporation be small and in the promotional
stage before allowing the grant of options or warrants to invest-
ment bankers.
The stock option and warrant regulations represent, to an
even greater degree than in the case of the regulations pertaining
to the rights of security holders, the application of the statutory
fair and just standards in a manner which directly and unevenly
affects corporate policy in matters far removed from the question
of fairness of a particular securities issue. The offering price
regulation, in contrast, is an application of the statutory standard
in an area directly related to the registration of securities.
d. Offering Price
The offering price regulation has two sections. Regulation
259(a) provides that if there is "an active and informed public
market," the offering price shall bear a "reasonable relation-
ship" to such price. The requirement of such a market would
limit the application of subsection (a) to relatively actively
traded and widely held securities. Even if an "active and in-
formed" public market exists, the Commissioner may presum-
ably make his own decision as to the reasonableness of the of-
fering price. If an "active and informed" public market as de-
fined in subsection (a) does not exist, Regulation 259 (b) applies.
It consists of four pricing standards of which the Commissioner
may apply any or all. First, the price agreed upon in a firm
commitment underwriting is an acceptable standard. This rule
was taken from the California Corporate Securities Act of
196872 where its function is quite different from that served
in the Minnesota regulation. Second, the offering price shall
71. Hueni, supra note 26, at 1428.
72. CAL. Cor. CODE § 25140 (d) (West Supp. 1970).
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be reasonably related to the trading prices of comparable com-
panies in the same industry. Third, the offering price shall not
exceed 25 times net earnings per share of the registrant. Fourth,
the offering price must be reasonably related to book value.
The incorporation into the Minnesota regulations of that
section of the California Corporate Securities Act of 1968 which
uses the price agreed upon in a firm commitment underwriting
as an alternative standard by which the Commissioner can judge
offering price is interesting, since the section was placed in the
California Act expressly to deny the California Commissioner
authority to make price decisions where the security is being
offered pursuant to a registration statement filed pursuant to the
1933 Act and the offering is the subject of a firm commitment
underwriting.7 3 The California experience indicates a possible
problem with Regulation 259 in that it puts the Commissioner
directly into the price setting business. It is indeed an ironic
example of the functioning of our federal system when a
statutory section drafted to curtail the authority of one state
73. H. MARsii & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA COR-
PORATE SEcURITIEs LAW OF 1968, 285-86 (1969). The authors explain the
reasoning behind the section as follows:
The Department of Corporations, particularly in the "hot issue"
era of the early 1960's sought to restrict the price-earnings mul-
tiple at which issuers could sell securities to the public by
reviewing the fairness of the offering price of securities to be
sold in California. Such efforts were not only rather presump-
tuous as to the ability of the Department of Corporations to
substitute its judgment for the arm's length negotiated bar-
gain of an issuer and underwriter, but in addition had the
effect of creating "hot issues" by control of the initial offering
price. If an underwriter had priced stock at fifty times
earnings because he believed that was fair to the issuer and
to his customers and approximately the price at which the se-
curities should trade in the after market following the offering,
the action of the Commissioner of Corporations in forcing
that price down to twenty-five times earnings simply created
a "hot issue." In many such cases the price of the stock doubled
on the offering date to the price at which in the underwriter's
judgment it should have been offered in the first instance.
The peculiar result of this supposed public protection was
that the initial purchasers of the securities, in most cases the
favored customers of the underwriter and in some cases even
the insiders of the underwriter and the issuer, profited by im-
mediate resale of the stock and the public purchaser paid the
ultimate price of fifty times earnings. The funds of the public
purchaser, rather than going to the issuer went to the first
purchaser. Thus, the public purchaser suffered the maximum
dilution and was actually injured by the application of price
control. Had he "over-paid" the issuer, he would at least have
had a portion of the benefit of the increased book value in
connection with his holdings of its securities.
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securities commissioner can be utilized as part of a regulation
which expands the authority of another.
e. Minimum Investment
The regulations covering the minimum amount which pro-
moters must have invested in a corporation offering its secur-
ities to the public (Regulations 270-73) are based on a State-
ment of Policy on Promoters Investment adopted by the
Midwest Security Commissioners Association on June 27, 1968. 74
The Minnesota regulations differ, however, in two important re-
spects from the Statement of Policy. First, they set the mini-
mum equity investment at 15 per cent rather than the 10 per
cent figure contained in the Statement of Policy, and, sec-
ond, although Regulation 270, following the Midwest Commis-
sioner's language, makes the regulation applicable to issuers
which are in "the promotional, exploratory or developmental
stage" the portion of the Statement of Policy which further
defines such issuers is omitted from the Minnesota regulation. 5
74. 1 BLuE SKY L. REP. 114771.
75. Id. at 1 4471(B) (i). "An issuer which is in the 'promotional
or developmental stage' [is] an issuer which has no significant record
of operations or earnings prior to the proposed offering date .. ."
Compare Rule 253(a) (1) & (2) under Regulation A of the 1933 Act
defining issuers, which are treated as promotional for Regulation A
ceiling computation purposes:
(a) The following provisions of this rule shall apply to any
offering under this regulation of securities of any issuer
which-(1) was incorporated or organized within one year
prior to the date of filing the notification re-
quired by Rule 255 and has not had a net in-
come from operations; or(2) was incorporated or organized more than one
year prior to such date and has not had a net
income from operations, of the character in which
the issuer intends to engage, for at least one of
the last two fiscal years.
Also, compare the requirements for the use of Form S-2 under the 1933
Act:
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
(A) Rule as to Use of 'Form S-2. This form is to be used for
registration of shares of stock of any corporation which
are to be sold to the public for cash, if such corporation-(a) is not an insurance, investment or mining company;(b) has not had any substantial gross returns from the sale ofproducts or services, or any substantial net income from
any source, for any fiscal year ended during the past five
years;(c) has not succeeded and does not intend to succeed to any
business which has had any substantial gross returns
from the sale of products or services, or any substantial
net income from any source, for any fiscal year ended
during the past five years; and
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The effect of the difference is to increase the discretion of the
Commissioner in allowing him to exercise his judgment as to
which corporations will be deemed to be in the "promotional,
exploratory or developmental stage."
Other than New Mexico and Utah, which provide that a "sub-
stantial" equity investment is required, and Arizona, which
has adopted a sliding scale approach relating the minimum
equity investment to the total amount to be raised in the pub-
lic offering, the remaining states which regulate minimum invest-
ment follow an approach similar to the Statement of Policy, at
least to the extent of adopting the 10 per cent requirement.7
Although it does not define the important general concept
of "promotional companies," the Minnesota regulation does con-
tain a detailed discussion of the relatively narrow problem of
determining when appraised value of real estate may be in-
cluded as part of the promoter's investment.77 The appraised
value regulation provides that if appraised value is utilized to
comply with the minimum equity investment rule, "that ap-
praised value may not be reflected in any form, either in the
prospectus or in the issuer's financial statements or any foot-
notes thereto." Presumably this protects the public from being
misled by the speculative and subjective element inherent in
any real estate appraisal. However, if the Commissioner has de-
cided to allow appraised value to be used, presumably he has
determined that such danger has been substantially mini-
(d) does not have and does not intend to have any subsidiaries
other than inactive subsidiaries with no more than nomi-
nal assets.
In addition to Minnesota, Illinois, Michigan and Missouri impose a
15 per cent minimum investment test. The variations among such states
defining the corporations to which the minimum investment rule is to
apply illustrates the bewildering variety of approaches to Blue Sky
regulation. Neither the Illinois nor the Michigan regulations define
promotional companies. See Ill. Rule 150, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 516,627;
Mich. Rule 451.706.7, 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. 25,636. The Missouri regula-
tions, however, contain a detailed definition focusing on gross revenues
and the relationship between revenues and expenses. Mo. Rule VI (E),
id. at 1 28,606.
76. The New Mexico policy is expressed in Regulation I(B), (C)
& (D), 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. % 34,603. Utah combines its regulations on
minimum investment and cheap stock. Utah Regs. 3A-D, 3 BLUE SKY
L. REP. 47,604. Arizona's sliding scale approach (10% of the first
$200,000 of public offering, 5% of the second $200,000 and 1% of the
balance) is set out in Ariz. Regs. S-7, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 6657. An
example of the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association approach
is the Wisconsin regulation. Wisc. Regs. 3.05, 3 BLUE SKY L. RE'.
52,603.
77. Regs. S. Div. 273.
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mized. At that point, perhaps the public should be let in on the
secret between the Commissioner and the registrant. Surely
the application of fair and just standards does not preclude
full disclosure.
L Speculative Issues-Cheap Stock
The regulations pertaining to promotional securities and
cheap stock (Regulations 295-97) have been briefly discussed in
part b, supra. While the minimum investment regulations do
not define promotional companies, Regulation 296 does define
those corporations to which the cheap stock regulations do not
apply. The interests of both consistency and certainty would
be served by using the same definition in both the cheap stock
and minimum investment areas. Such consistency is particu-
larly desirable because the restriction on the number of pro-
motional shares and shares of cheap stock contained in Reg-
ulation 297 is directly related to the equity investment of the
issuer as defined in the minimum investment regulations.
The description of corporations to which the promotional
securities and cheap stock regulations apply is significant,
among other reasons, because the regulations provide that a
condition to the registration of securities by such an issuer may
be the imposition of restrictions on the transferability of such
shares. Such restrictions may take the form of legends imprinted
on the stock certificates or escrow agreements. 78 Currently the
normal practice of the Division is to utilize escrow agreements
for such situations.
g. Financial Statements
In 1962 regulations were adopted in Minnesota requiring
that offerings made in the state contain certified financial state-
ments.79 However, the rule was not followed in practice until
1970 when the financial statement regulations were substan-
tially revised.80 Regulation 742 requires a certification of the
balance sheet as of the close of the latest fiscal year, certifica-
tions of profit and loss statements for the two fiscal years im-
mediately preceding the balance sheet for all offerings of less
than $300,000, and profit and loss statement certifications for
the fiscal years immediately preceding the balance sheet date
78. Regs. S. Div. 401.
79. MsmoA -um, supra note 43, at 2.
80. Id.
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for all offerings in excess of $300,000. While certified financial
statements are required in all filings registered with the SEC
under the 1933 Act,8 ' they are not required for offerings made
pursuant to the Regulation A exemption.8 2 Since the adoption
of the Minnesota regulations, the maximum dollar amount of
securities which may be offered pursuant to Regulation A has
been increased by the SEC to $500,000.3
A number of states require that certified financial state-
ments be included in Regulation A offering circulars used to of-
fer securities in such states.8 4  The SEC recently considered
whether or not to amend Regulation A to require certified fi-
nancial statements, but decided against such an amendment., "
While recognizing that "a requirement for certification would
provide a check on issuer's financial disclosures performed
by an independent party at least in some measure responsible
both to the Commission ... and to the public purchasers," the
Wheat Report study concluded that "the principal objection is
one of cost, together with the fact that such a requirement would
narrow the gap between what is designed to be an exemption
from registration, and the registration process under Regula-
tions C and S-X." It was also reported that "the strong senti-
ment" of the SEC Regional Administrators was against requir-
ing certification.8 6 The effect of the Minnesota policy is to ne-
gate the federal policy expressed in Regulation A. Persons de-
siring to offer their securities in Minnesota under Regulation
A must, therefore, comply with the financial statement certifi-
cation requirements of Regulation 742.
h. Conclusions
The extended regulations on standards of qualification are
intended "to furnish guidelines for the qualification, pursuant
to the discretion of the Commissioner authorized by the Min-
nesota Securities Law, of offers and sales of securities. '87 Pro-
viding the flesh on the deceptively frail frame contained in
Section 80.08 of the Minnesota Securities Act, the standards reg-
81. See L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
ch. 7 (2d ed. rev., 1966).
82. SEC Schedule I to Notification on Form I-A, Item 11.
83. SEC Securities Act Release, No. 5125 (January 7, 1971).
84. Wheat Report, supra note 20, at 300 n.1.
85. Id. at 299.
86. Id.
87. Regs. S. Div. 201.
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ulations are an expansion of the statutory provision permitting
the Commissioner to deny an application for registration if he
is of the opinion that the terms of the securities are "unfair and
unjust." They demonstrate both the Commissioner's power in
promulgating the regulations and the refined meanings of the
"unfair and unjust" language. Attempts to challenge the Com-
missioner's authority have generally been unsuccessful,88 but
the scope of the regulations raises the question of the extent to
which the specificity and increasing strictness with which the
various commissioners have interpreted Section 80.08 is consis-
tent with legislative intent and appropriate public policy. Cer-
tainly any legislative revision of the Act which does not come
to grips with the regulations, and particularly the standards reg-
ulations, will miss a good part of the mark. Given the gener-
ality of the Act, clearly the standards regulations are the ef-
fective criteria for securities registration in Minnesota.
However, it would be a mistake to conclude that a securities
registration in Minnesota is merely a matter of consulting and
complying with the standards regulations. To begin with, they
are incomplete. Many matters which come up in the course of
a registration are not covered. The very specificity of many of
the regulations requires the practice of the practical art of
execption. The Commissioner's discretion means that nego-
tiation with the Division is a characteristic of Blue Sky prac-
tice in Minnesota. Such informality is, however, not unique to
Minnesota practice, for as Loss and Cowett point out "most
Blue Sky law is practiced informally."89
As a result of the regulations which have been promul-
gated to effect the mandate of Section 80.08, Minnesota joins
the company of the most rigorous states in the country in terms
of Blue Sky regulation The rigorous standards of qualification,
along with limitations on the number of persons to whom shares
in enterprises may be sold without registrationO must have a sig-
nificant impact on the creation and growth of new enterprises.
However, there appear to be no empirical economic studies what-
soever which analyze the effect of such regulation.9 1 It is
88. See, e.g., Northwest Bancorporation v. Benson, 6 F. Supp. 704,
722 (1934); Kerst v. Nelson, 171 Minn. 191, 213 N.W. 904 (1927).
89. L. Loss & E. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 44 (1958).
90. See part II E infra.
91. Garcia & Kantor, Dark Clouds in a Blue Sky: An Analysis of
the Limited Offering Exemption, 23 U. oF MIAI L. REv. 568 (1969), is
an attempt to relate the economic effect of the limited offering exemp-
tions found in many Blue Sky laws on close corporation financing, al-
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certainly not clear that the type of Blue Sky regulation em-
bodied in the Minnesota qualification standards is effective in
countering fraud. 2 On the other hand, as one commentator has
said
though its analysis is primarily legal as opposed to economic. Professor
Mofsky recommends such an in-depth study in the course of an excellent
survey of the relative restrictiveness of various Blue Sky laws on new
business in J. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW BUSINESS
PROMOTIONS (1971). See also Manne & Mofsky, What Price Blue
Sky?, BARRON'S, August 5, 1968, at 5. In commenting on the need for
reform of Blue Sky laws, Mofsky concludes:
Before any meaningful reform in the blue sky field is
undertaken, whether it be through federal pre-emption or on a
state-by-state basis, we need more precise answers to the wel-
fare economics aspects of the state securities laws. This trea-
tise attempted to elaborate what seemed to be some of the
specialized cost features of the blue sky laws which are prob-
ably not familiar to many lawyers, businessmen, economists
and statisticians. It is hoped that with this model available,
and with the more obvious factors necessary for analyzing the
benefit side of such regulation, the cogent measurements and
calculations can be made by appropriate specialists. It is also
hoped that this work will cause lawyers and businessmen
through bar association committees, trade associations and leg-
islative action, to seek meaningful analysis of the blue sky laws
rather than merely accepting an area of regulation which has
not been fully and rigorously explored.
J. MOFSKY, supra, at 86. He is also critical of the new Wisconsin
and California statutes arguing that state Blue Sky administrators
should not play a key role in the reform of Blue Sky laws:
It is submitted that while the draftsmen of those statutes
did indeed effect considerable improvements over the pre-
existing laws they did not in fact truly reappraise the philoso-
phy underlying the blue sky laws. Such an examination is
necessary before any meaningful revision can be drafted and
enacted. If the California and Wisconsin experiences typify the
kind of reform which results when state administrators par-
ticipate and help sponsor the revision, then meaningful change
must come without their assistance.
Id. at 84.
92. Professor Harold Bloomenthal has recently questioned the ef-
ficacy of such regulation:
In fact, none of the regulation described is designed to pre-
vent "fraud"; rather, it is concerned primarily in limiting the
promoter's participation in the event the venture is successful.
If the venture is unsuccessful the extent of the promoter's in-
vestment, the amount of cheap stock, stock options and the
extent of dilution will be of little, if any, consequence. Such
ventures are likely to be a complete disaster; the blue sky
regulation at best may in a few instances save some assets for
the investors upon liquidation. The provisions against trans-
fer of promotional stock will preclude the promoter from per-
sonally bailing out in whole or part before the success or failure
of the venture is determined, but the public protection is not
enhanced in this respect unless it can be established that he
is thus provided with an incentive to make the company a
successful one.
Bloomenthal, Blue Sky Regulation and the Theory of Overkill, 15
WAYNE L. REV. 1447, 1482-83 (1969).
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[I]t is apparent that blue sky legislation may result in im-
portant and dangerous economic consequences with respect
to three related entrepreneurial problems: financing a new
business, promoter control and sufficient reward for entre-
preneurship. There are other significant economic ramifications,
but these three problems are particularly serious with regard to
the development of new firms.03
The adoption in 1970 of the substantial portion of the Minnesota
regulations was not accompanied by any showing of need based
upon a history of fraudulent schemes in Minnesota, and there
are suggestions that the present level of regulation may have a
chilling effect on some local businesses . 4
3. Registration by Notification
Section 80.09 of the Act provides a procedure whereby an
issuer, in lieu of registering by application under Section 80.08,
may file a notification of intention to sell securities. If no ac-
tion is taken by the Commissioner within 48 hours of the filing
of the notification, the Act provides that the "securities covered
thereby shall become registered .. . .,,5 The information re-
quired to be filed with the notification is minimal.10 This so-
called "quality securities" registration provision of Section 80.09
is available only to a limited group of securities: (i) securities
secured by a first mortgage on real estate; (ii) securities of
corporations meeting certain financial history requirements;
(iii) certain seasoned securities; and (iv) securities issued by
nonprofit associations. For those issuers fortunate enough to
qualify under it, Section 80.09 provides a haven from the time-
consuming and complex procedures of registration under
Section 80.08. Because it provides such a haven, a considera-
tion of it would be unnecessary in this article were it not for
the reference to Section 80.09 found in Section 80.06(14), one
of the secondary market or "trading" exemptions in the Act.
Among the requirements for an exemption stated therein is that
"Such securities would qualify for registration by notification
pursuant to the provisions of Section 80.09."97 As part of a sec-
ondary market exemption, the reference to Section 80.09 poses
93. Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions,
1969 DuKE L.J. 273, 288-89.
94. See MEMORAlzDUo supra note 43, at 1.
95. lm. STAT. § 80.09 (2) (4) (1969).
96. Loss and Cowett, writing in 1958, indicate that Minnesota's
notification provision for quality securities is one of 25 such "stream-
lined" types of registration, L. Loss & E. Coivzrr, supra note 89, at 34.
97. Mn_.m. STAT. § 80.06(14(d) (1969) (emphasis added).
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serious problems.98 Indeed it appears that Minnesota is the only
state other than North Dakota99 and (to a limited extent) Tex-
as'0 ° which utilizes the quality security provision as an element
of the secondary market exemption.
Subdivision 2(2) of Section 80.09 applies an earnings test
to three different types of securities of issuers which have had
five years of continuous operation.10 1 The earnings require-
ment is that the corporation must have had "average annual
net earnings ... and assets [which] together with the pro-
ceeds of the sale of such securities accruing to the issuer" as of
the close of the fiscal year next preceding such notification equal
to a certain figure with reference to each of the three types of se-
curities described in subsections (a), (b), and (c). This subdi-
vision poses difficult accounting considerations. The relevant
figure is "annual net earnings", although it is not defined. No
guidance is given as to problems posed by changes of accounting
methods or periods, and "income taxes" is also undefined (does
it refer to federal only, or federal and state, or federal, state and
local?)10 2 Other questions include: what are "charges"; what
are "accepted accounting practices"; must the issuer utilize au-
dited statements or are internally produced figures adequate?
The word "assets" is ambiguous in the full paragraph and re-
98. See text accompanying notes 126-28 infra.
99. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-06 (1969).
100. TEx. CIV. STAT. § 581-5 (1969) (as an alternative to listing in
a recognized securities manual).
101. (a) In the case of interest-bearing securities notless than one and one-half times the annual interest charge
thereon and upon all other outstanding interest-bearing obli-
gations of equal rank, and assets at least equal to 125 per cent
of the face value of such interest-bearing securities, and all
other obligations of equal or prior rank outstanding and not tobe retired out of the proceeds of the sale of such securities.(b) In the case of preferred stock, not less than one and
one-half times the annual dividend on such preferred stock and
on all other outstanding stock of equal rank, and assets at
least equal to 125 per cent of the par value of the aggregate
amount of such preferred stock and all other outstandingpreferred stock of equal rank, after the deduction from such
assets of all indebtedness, which will be existing and all stock
of senior rank which will be outstanding after the application
of the proceeds of the preferred stock offered for sale.(c) In the case of common stock, not less than four per
cent upon all outstanding common stock of equal rank together
with the amount of common stock then offered for sale, all
reckoned upon the price at which the stock is then offered for
sale or sold.
MINN. STAT. § 80.09 (2) (2) (1969).
102. In 1965 the section was amended to add "after income taxes"
following "average annual net earnings" and to delete "prior" which
had appeared before "charges." Minn. Laws 1965, ch. 333.
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mains so where it is used in subsections (a) and (b) and in
its absence from subsection (c). 103 Are assets to be included
with earnings in making the computation? If included, are
they to be omitted from subsection (c) but included in subsec-
tions (d) and (e)? At best Subdivision 2(2) contains enough
ambiguities to make reliance on it a delicate matter. At worst,
it is too vague to be relied upon (particularly in connection with
Section 80.06 (14)).
4. Commission Orders
Assuming one has successfully threaded through Section
80.08 or Section 80.09, an order signed by the Commissioner will
evidence success. Section 80.07 provides that "the Commission
may provide in the order of registration that the registration
permits sale of a specified number only of units of a security
and that there may be no secondary market trading in such
securities until further order of the Commission." While "sec-
ondary market trading" is not defined in the statute, unless
the Commissioner's order provides for it, the registration will,
in effect, expire upon the sale of the specified number of units
covered in the order. Subsequent sales by purchasers of units
so covered will be allowable only if an exemption is available
for such sale or if the Order for Registration is subsequently
amended to cover secondary market sales.
Prior to the 1969 amendment of Section 80.07, a regis-
tration limited to sales to original purchasers was termed a "re-
stricted registration" 10 4 As it then appeared, the section pro-
vided that the issuer could request either "unlimited" or "re-
stricted" registrations, and that in the absence of any specific
reference the registration was deemed to be "restricted." This
was a trap for the unwary, and Section 80.07 as amended in
1969 provides that unless the order specifically limits the regis-
tration, it shall allow sales of all outstanding or to be outstand-
ing units of a security without further action. It should be noted,
however, that the language of the third paragraph of Section
80.07 is not coextensive with the concept of "secondary market
trading" as generally understood in the industry. Among other
things, the third paragraph of Section 80.07 refers only to
broker-dealers and does not cover the problem of sales by
private purchasers. Details of handling the request for sec-
103. See note 101 supra.
104. Mnm. STAT. § 80.07 (1967).
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ondary market trading, particularly in connection with the re-
quirement that a $500 fee be paid before such trading will be
allowed, are generally worked out by registrants on a case by
case basis with the Division. The problem requires particularly
close attention when the registrant previously has not been pub-
licly held. 10 5
Having obtained an Order for Registration containing "sec-
ondary market trading" provisions, can a registrant or broker-
dealer rest secure feeling that his encounters with the Minne-
sota Securities Division are over? Section 80.11(3) of the Act
requires that within 30 days after each anniversary date of a
registration, the registration must be renewed. Failure to re-
new the registration by paying a $10 renewal fee and filing cer-
tain financial information'1 6 may result in cancellation by the
Commissioner of the registration. An annual report resulting
in the renewal of the registration may be filed by "any per-
son."'1 7 Thus the information necessary to keep a registration
in effect does not have to be provided by the issuer or by the
broker-dealer who obtained the original order. One rationale
for such a provision may be that persons not involved with the
original registration can be seriously affected by failures to re-
new it.
The distinction between a registration for sale to original
purchasers only and one which allows for secondary market
trading is unique to the Minnesota Act.'0 8 Hence, broker-
dealers and issuers who are not experienced in operating under
the Act may assume that its renewal provisions function in the
same manner as in many other states. The normal practice
in other states is to cancel the registration upon completion
of the sale of the shares originally registered. The registra-
tion is kept open only while shares are being sold to the origi-
nal purchasers. As a matter of routine, many non-Minnesota
issuers and broker-dealers will notify the Blue Sky authorities
of the states involved, at the time an earlier registration comes
up for renewal, that it need not be renewed (indeed it is often
105. See W. ANASTAS, STATE SECURITIES REGISTRATION 7.51-7.52(Univ. of Minn., Dept. of Cont. Legal Ed., Practice Manual No. 38,
1970).
106. The renewal is made on Form 102 of the Minnesota Securities
Division. Since the renewal date relates to the anniversary of the
original registration, as opposed to the registrant's fiscal year, the
financial information contained in Form 102 may be quite out of date.
107. MINN. STAT. § 80.11(3) (1969).
108. W. ANASTAS, supra note 105, at 7.51.
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the procedure to cancel the registration upon the completion
of the offering). Thus, an action which is routine in many
states may have unintended and' disastrous consequences in
Minnesota since the effect of a failure to renew is that the secur-
ities of the issuer are no longer registered in Minnesota.
The 1969 amendment to Section 80.07 which provides that
"any licensed broker-dealer may sell additional units of a se-
curity so registered if he had no reason to believe that such
additional units were issued in violation of Section 80.08" may
have been intended to protect broker-dealers from the trap de-
scribed above. A more reasonable solution would be to elim-
inate the requirement of continuing registration. No legitimate
regulatory purpose seems to be served by the requirement. Other
than very sketchy financial information which the public never
sees and which the Commissioner rarely, if ever, acts upon,
no information is provided by the renewal application. If the
Commissioner becomes concerned about a security being traded
in the state, he has ample power to act (e.g., under Section 80.11
or Section 80.23) and would be derelict in his duty if he waited
until the annual registration came up for renewal. The matter
is one of concern to the investment banking community.'00 Prior
to 1969, the problem was even more serious because it was not
only one of inadvertent cancellations or inadvertent failure to
file the annual renewal. The broker-dealer and issuer then
also faced the difficulty of an ambiguity in the registration order
itself as to whether it was for a restricted or unlimited reg-
istration. Despite the removal of the latter difficulty, the prob-
lem of cancellation through inadvertence or misunderstanding
still exists and, of course, a registration may be revoked or sus-
pended by the Commissioner.? 0
How is the broker-dealer engaged in transactions in a se-
curity based on a prior effective registration order to know of
such cancellation, termination, or suspension? Section 80.11(3)
provides that "no suspension, revocation, or cancellation of a reg-
istration shall become effective as to any person prior to his
receipt of actual notice thereof, or, as to any person not there-
109. See memorandum dated January 28, 1971 from Merrill, Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith to George J. Crowe, Acting Minnesota Securi-
ties Commissioner, at 2, on file with Minnesota Law Review. Among
its other comments the memorandum asks with justifiable plaintive-
ness: "[w]ould [it] not be possible to exempt all outstanding securities
for secondary purposes after a registration statement has become effect-
ive?" Id.
110. MnNN. STAT. § 80.11(2) (1969).
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tofore receiving actual notice thereof, prior to the second busi-
ness day following the mailing to such person by the commis-
sion of notice thereof or the filing by the commission of tele-
graphic notice thereof to such person." Read literally, the sub-
division seems to say that the broker-dealer (or issuer) must
be notified of a suspension, revocation or cancellation as a con-
dition to its effectiveness as against such broker-dealer or is-
suer. The preceding paragraph of subdivision (3) is quite spe-
cific in limiting requests for cancellations of registration to
"the person who made the application or gave the notification
on which such registration was made."'' Therefore, "any per-
son" in the third paragraph may be read to cover a broader
class than "the person who made the application or gave the
notification" in the second paragraph and the broker-dealer en-
gaged in market making or casual trades for a customer would
be covered by the notice requirement as well as the issuer and
broker-dealer, if any, who obtained the original order. While
the Minnesota Supreme Court has dealt with the question of
appropriate notice of cancellation of a registration order,'1 2 it
has not done so since the enactment of the amendment contain-
ing the notice provision. 113 The Blue Sky laws of at least eight
states provide for notice to be given to persons other than those
who filed the registration. Three describe the persons to whom
notice must be given generally,"" while five require that no-
tice be given to broker-dealers. 1 5 In states where there is an ex-
111. MINN. STAT. § 80.11(3) (1969).
112. In State ex rel. Canam Metals, Ltd. v. Dept. of Commerce,
Securities Division, 196 Minn. 222, 264 N.W. 789 (1936), the court held
that a registration made "for" the issuer and the underwriter could
not be withdrawn solely at the request of the underwriter:
The order having been issued for the protection of two it
certainly is not the intention of the law that one by an ex parte
proceeding may withdraw that protection from the other with-
out notice to the one from whom are so stripped the privileges
and immunity conferred by the order.
Id. at 226, 264 N.W. at 791.
113. Minn. Laws 1942, ch. 547, 1 8.
114. GA. CODE ANN. § 97-109 (1968) ("to the issuer . .. and to all
persons who have registered such securities"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
121%, § 137.11 (I) (1960) ("to the person or persons concerned"); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 62-53 (1962) ("to all interested parties").
115. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1924(B) (1967) ("to the issuer of
the securities and to all registered dealers engaged in the sale thereof");
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.709 (1965) ("to the issuer and every regis-
tered broker dealer"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-09 (1960) ("to all regis-
tered dealers"); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 62-53 (1962) ("to all licensed
dealers concerned"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1617 (1964) ("to all regis-
tered dealers"). The statutes cited in this note and supra at note 114
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plicit requirement that notice of revocation be given to the ap-
plicant, the courts appear inclined to require prospective plain-
tiffs to prove that the defendant received actual notice of re-
vocation.11 6
There would appear to be two constitutional questions rele-
vant to the issue of the scope of the Minnesota notice provi-
sion. First, is Section 80.11 itself an unconstitutional delega-
tion of discretionary power to the Commissioner? The sec-
tion is not devoid of standards by which the Commissioner
must be governed in exercising his discretion, and it seems un-
likely that such an argument would be upheld.1 17 Second, if
the notice section is not interpreted to require that notice of
cancellation be given to all broker-dealers licensed in Minne-
sota and if a broker-dealer is sued for rescission on a sale of a
security which has become unregistered because of such can-
cellation, is not the section unconstitutional because it would act
to deprive such broker-dealer of his property without due proc-
ess of law? The answer to this question may well differ depend-
ing on the party complaining of lack of notice.'18 The due
generally do not specify whether the notice involved is of final revo-
cation of a registration or of the hearing on the revocation.
116. See State v. Fisher, 140 Kan. 544, 547, 38 P.2d 120, 122 (1934);
Lefebvre v. Whittier & Co., 84 N.L 105, 106, 146 A. 527, 528 (1929).
117. See Northwest Bancorporation v. Benson, 6 F. Supp. 704, 708,
718, 722 (D. Minn., 1934). The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld such
an attack on the Wisconsin Blue Sky law in Klein v. Barry, 182 Wisc.
255, 196 N.W. 457 (1923). The Klein case would seem to be distin-
guishable from the problem here discussed because of the differences
in discretion granted by each statute to the respective commissioners.
See also Kerst v. Nelson, 171 Minn. 191, 195, 213 N.W. 904, 905 (1927)
("[I]t should be the policy of the courts to refrain from hampering the
state officials in the performance of their duties by placing a narrow
construction on [Blue Sky Laws]").
118. Compare Cities Service Co. v. Koeneke, 137 Kan. 7, 20 P.2d
460 (1933) (cancellation provision of Kansas Blue Sky law unconstitu-
tional as applied against issuer-registrant who had no notice of regis-
tration cancellation), with cases cited in Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1067 (1959)
(relating to rights of persons other than licensee to have notice and
hearing prior to a liquor license suspension, indicating that, generally,
the rule is that such persons have no such right). See 1 K. DAvis, ADMI-
isTRA=vE LAw TREATcsE 7.18-.19 (1958). The bMinnesota Supreme
Court has held that, under certain circumstances, notice and hearing
is not a prerequisite to a liquor license revocation. See Abeln v. City
of Shakopee, 224 Minn. 262, 267, 28 N.W.2d 642, 645 (1947). The extent
to which persons are entitled to notice is affected by whether such en-
titlement is characterized as a "right" or a "privilege" as a matter of
constitutional law. The Abeln decision indicates that the Minnesota
court considered the distinction of significance. See generally Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HeRv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
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process argument would seem to offer little solace to the hap-
less broker-dealer who discovers that he has been trading an
unregistered security. Given the continuous registration con-
cept of the Act, fundamental fairness dictates that some relia-
ble and practical mechanism be effected for providing notice of
the termination, cancellation, or revocation of registrations.' '
C. REGISTRATION OF SECONDARY TRADING TRANSACTIONS
The previous discussion of the registration provisions of the
Act has focused primarily on issuer transactions. But, the pur-
view of the Act is not limited to the regulation of corporations
issuing securities to the public. It also extends to nonissuer se-
curities transactions. Such nonissuers may either be securities
dealers or merely individuals who wish to sell their securities.
The application of the registration provisions of the Blue Sky
laws to nonissuer transactions poses some of the most serious
difficulties in Blue Sky practice.120
The nonissuer who is not a professional broker-dealer in
Minnesota can sell securities owned by him pursuant to one of
the exemptions contained in Section 80.06. If his sale is to a
licensed broker-dealer, the transaction would be exempt under
Section 80.06(8). Such transactions should be exempt regard-
less of whether the security involved has been registered in
Minnesota. On the other hand, a nonissuer, nonprofessional
broker-dealer wishing to make several sales of a corporate se-
curity may run into difficulties under the Act.12 '
The professional broker-dealer wishing to trade a particular
security in Minnesota may undertake to register such security
119. In 1971, because of budgetary limitations, the Securities Divi-
sion resisted introduction of legislation to require notice of such actions
to all licensed broker-dealers. A privately published weekly magazine,
COMMERCIAL WEST (published by Sun Newspapers, Inc.) contains a
section devoted to actions of the Securities Division, which some-
times prints a report on the disposition of each registration appearing
on the Division's docket.
120. In many statutes it is difficult or impossible to say with
any certainty when registration is required in such a case;
who must or may register; how many units of the security
should be registered; who may sell once a registration becomes
effective; and as a result who is civilly liable and when a
contract to sell is enforceable.
1 L. Loss, SEcuRITiEs REGULATION 62 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969). For an
excellent summary of the problem of nonissuer transactions both under
Blue Sky laws and the Securities Act of 1933, see Note, Regulations of
Nonissuer Transactions under Federal and State Securities Regulation
Laws, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1635 (1965).
121. See part II E 1 infra.
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under Section 80.08 or Section 80.09, he may determine that an
effective registration statement is in force and base his activities
on the fourth paragraph of Section 80.07, or he may rely
on an exemption from registration, either for the security or the
transaction. The brokerage community generally considers Sec-
tion 80.06(14) to be the basic secondary market or trading ex-
emption available to it in Minnesota, although agency transactions
may be made in reliance on the exemption contained in Section
80.06 (10). The trading exemption of Section 80.06 (14) exempts
from the registration requirements of the Act:
The sale by a licensed broker-dealer, acting either as principal
or agent, of securities theretofore sold and distributed to the
public, provided that:
(a) Such securities are sold at prices reasonably related to the
current market price thereof at the time of sale and if such
broker-dealer is acting as agent, that the commission col-
lected by such broker-dealer on account of the sale thereof
is not in excess of usual and customary commissions col-
lected with respect to securities and transactions having
comparable characteristics; and(b) Such securities do not constitute an unsold allotment to
or subscription by such broker-dealer as a participant in the
distribution of such securities by the issuer or by or through
an underwriter; and
(c) Either Moody's, Fitch's or Standard and Poor's securities
manuals, or other recognized securities manuals approved
by the commissioner of securities contain the names of the
issuer's officers and directors, a balance sheet of the issuer
as of a date not more than 18 months prior to the date of
such sale, and a profit and loss statement of issuer for the
fiscal year preceding the date of such balance sheet; and
(d) Such securities would qualify for registration by notification
pursuant to the provisions of section 80.09; and
(e) Such securities are limited to issuers organized under the
laws of any state or territory or insular possession of the
United States.
The Act's trading exemption has counterparts in the laws of a
number of states, although most require only that the security in
question be listed in a recognized securities manual.12 2  The
Uniform Securities Act exempts a nonissuer distribution if re-
cent financial statements and a list of the issuer's officers and
directors are contained in a recognized securities manual or the
security being distributed has a fixed maturity, dividend, or
interest provision and no default has occurred thereon for a
specified period.1
23
122. Note, supra note 120, at table facing 1648. The manual ex-
emptions are also summarized in Gray & Rosen, Section 12(g) and
Blue Sky Laws, 20 Bus. LAw. 1075, 1076 (1965). For a table of statutes
which exempt securities listed in manuals and the names of such
manuals, see 1 BLuE SKY L. REP. 831.
123. UIirFoam SEcuarnzs ACT § 402(b) (2).
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Why securities listed in securities manuals are exempted
from registration under Blue Sky laws is far from clear. Inclu-
sion in a manual is not an indication of the quality of a security
and this would seem to negate one theory upon which the ex-
emption may have been based.1 2 4 In any event, the securities
manuals are not generally available to investors and the in-
clusion of false or inaccurate information in a securities manual
probably does not give rise to civil or criminal liability (at least
if the information was not knowingly false or inaccurate when
given). Subsection (c) of Section 80.06(14) specifically names
three manuals and then goes on to refer to "other recognized
securities manuals approved by the Commissioner of Securities."
This pattern is similar to the approach followed in some
states, while others do not give their administrator discretion
to recognize manuals other than those listed in the statute, and
still others list no manuals in the statute, giving the administrator
full discretion which is generally implemented either in the adop-
tion of regulations or in informal policies which can be de-
termined only by correspondence directly with the administra-
tor.1
25
Perhaps because of the anomaly of the manual exemption
as part of a Blue Sky philosophy which emphasizes a qualita-
tive determination, the Minnesota statute has added Subsection
(d) to the manual exemption provisions of Section 80.06(14).
The requirement that a corporation meet an earnings require-
ment in addition to meeting the test of the manual exemption in
order to qualify for the trading exemption is found in no other
state statute containing a manual exemption except in North
Dakota.' 26 Whatever the reason for the inclusion of Subsection
(d) in the trading exemption section, the effect is to transform
124. "[I]t cannot be assumed that because a company appears in
the Manuals that it is in sound financial condition and that its credit is
good." Letter from Moody's Investors Service, quoted in 1 BLUE SKY
L. REP. at 835. Some attempt to increase the quantifiable standards for
listing may be occurring. While the letter from Standard & Poor's
Corporation (quoted id.) states that "[W]e generally exclude com-
panies with less than $1,000,000 asset value and less than 200 stock-
holders," a list of factors to be considered by the editorial board in de-
termining whether to include a corporation in its manual sent to the
author on February 23, 1971, by Standard & Poor's Corporation lists
assets of $2,500,000 and not less than 750 shareholders as conditions.
A copy of this letter is on file with the Minnesota Law Review.
125. In addition to the three manuals listed in the Act, the Minne-
sota Commissioner recognizes Moody's Over- the-Counter Industrial
Manual, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 833.
126. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-06-8d (1969).
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an exemption which at least might have had the virtue of clarity
to one which poses serious problems for those who would rely
on it. As has been indicated previously, compliance with Sec-
tion 80.09 in the context of a registration is difficult because of
the many ambiguities in the statutory language itself.-'t To
utilize Section 80.09 as part of an exemption exacerbates such
problems. Subsection (d) states that the securities "would qual-
ify for registration." When must the securities have been eligi-
ble for qualification? Since the introductory language to Sec-
tion 80.06 itself and the introductory language to Subdivision (14)
seem to refer to the sale of specific securities, it might be as-
sumed that the relevant date is the date of the transaction in
question. However, this places upon the broker-dealers the
impractical burden of determining the eligibility for registra-
tion under Section 80.09 of the security in question each time
a trade is effected. An alternative interpretation is that the
securities in question must have been eligible for Section 80.09
qualification as of the close of the fiscal year preceding the
transaction in question. Subdivision 2(2) of Section 80.09 em-
ploys that concept with regard to the period for making the earn-
ings determination necessary for registration thereunder. The
virtue of such an interpretation is that it makes the exemption
viable, although it is not compelled by the language of the stat-
ute any more than the interpretation which would require the
determination of Section 80.09 eligibility to be made at the time
of each trade. Another unusual element of Section 80.06(14) is
Subsection (e), which limits the exemption to domestic cor-
porate securities. Since the subdivision is a part of a scheme
of regulation of broker-dealers rather than corporate issuers,
considerations of jurisdiction over corporate issuers should not
have dictated the inclusion of Subsection (e), and its presence
may be explicable only as a touching, if somewhat naive, ex-
ample of legislative parochialism. Like Subsection (d), Sub-
section (e) also appears in the North Dakota law.1'2 8
An important exemption from the point of view of broker-
dealers is contained in Section 80.06 (10), which exempts:
[t]he solicitation or execution of any orders by a licensed
broker-dealer for the purchase or sale of any security; pro-
vided, that such broker-dealer acts as agent for the purchaser or
seller, and has no direct material interest in the sale or distribu-
tion of such security, receives no commission, profit, or other
compensation from any source other than the purchase or
127. See text accompanying notes 99-103 supra.
128. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-04-06-8e (1969).
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seller and delivers to the purchaser or seller written confirma-
tion of the transaction which clearly itemizes his commission,
or other compensation.
Exemptions for brokerage transactions are found in most Blue
Sky laws,12 9 and the Uniform Securities Act exempts such trans-
actions in Section 402(b) (3). Since one aspect of Blue Sky reg-
ulation is registration and supervision of broker-dealers, the
regulatory element of the brokerage transaction exemption lies
in the continuing supervision exercised by state securities ad-
ministrators over broker-dealers. It has also been suggested
that the brokerage exemption should be further policed by re-
quiring brokers to prepare and keep lists of securities traded
pursuant to such an exemption. 130
Section 80.06 (10) differs from the analogous provisions of the
Uniform Securities Act and from the laws of most other states
in that it exempts both solicited and unsolicited nonissuer trans-
actions. It is thus broader than such other laws which limit
the exemption to orders to buy or sell not solicited by the
broker-dealer.13 ' Since the brokerage transaction exemption
in the Minnesota act is not dependent on whether or not the
order to buy or sell was solicited, the difficult problem of de-
termining whether or not an order was solicited (a problem
under both federal and state securities laws)132 is not presented
by Section 80.06(10). However, the protection against a sub-
stantial distribution of unregistered securities provided by the
ban on unsolicited transactions in statutes such as the Uniform
Securities Act is absent. Perhaps because of this, the Minne-
sota Securities Division has demonstrated some hostility to the
exemption,'133 and an amendment to the Act in 1969 had the
apparent effect of negating the whole brokerage transaction
exemption. 34  However, the 1969 amendment was further
129. Note, supra note 120, at table facing 1648.
130. L. Loss & E. CowETT, BLUE SKY LAW 364 (1958).
131. For statutes similarly broad see LA. REV. STAT. § 51.705(10)
(1965);W. VA. CODE § 32-1-4-(J) (1966).
132. See, e.g., L. Loss & E. COWETT, supra note 130, at 364-65; H.
MARSH & R. VOLK, PRACTICE UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CORPORATE SECURI-
TIES LAW OF 1968, 357-58 (1969).
133. In a communication to all Minnesota licensed broker-dealers
dated March 4, 1971, from the then Acting Commissioner of Securities,
the Division expressed concern about transactions in which the broker-
age exemption and the exemption for sales to licensed broker-dealers
(Section 80.06(8) ) are combined to effect a large scale distribution.
Copy on file with Minnesota Law Review.
134. In 1969, Subdivision 2(c) was added to Section 80.06 (Laws
1969, ch. 848) which exempted:
[t] he sale in this state by a licensed broker-dealer, acting either
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amended in 1971 to eliminate the conflict between Section 80.06
(2)(c) and Section 80.06(10), and the brokerage transaction
exemption seems to have been reaffirmed by the legislature as
it originally was enacted.
The proviso to Section 80.06(10) relates to the required
brokerage nature of the transaction, although the phrase "has
no direct material interest in the sale or distribution of such
security" has never been judicially construed. Presumably,
it was intended to cover something other than additional com-
mission or other payment made in connection with the particu-
lar transaction since the language directly following the quoted
phrase is aimed at the additional remuneration situation.
The very important area of nonissuer secondary market
transactions for securities not listed on stock exchanges is, then,
covered in the Minnesota Act by the exemptions of Subdivi-
sions (14) and (10) of Section 80.06. The Act's approach to
nonissuer secondary market exemptions is similar to that found
in many other states, although, for no apparent reason, the man-
ual exemption is narrower (because of the inclusion of Sub-
sections (d) and (e)) and the brokerage transaction exemption
is broader (because it is not limited to unsolicited transactions)
than the statutory pattern generally found elsewhere.
Since the manual exemption clearly does not serve as any
assurance that a qualitative judgment has been made on the se-
curities involved (in contrast with the theory which is presum-
ably behind exempting securities listed on stock exchanges), the
exemption must be premised on the theory that securities about
which information is available need not be registered for non-
as principal or agent of the securities of a single issuer; pro-
vided (1) that the persons to whom the sales are made by
such broker-dealer during any period of 12 consecutive months,
whether or not the seller or any of the buyers are then present
in this state, do not exceed five in number, other than those
designated in subdivision 8 of this section; and (2) that the
securities sold meet the requirements of clauses a), c), and(e) of subdivision 14 of this section; but the commission may by
rule or order, as to any security or transaction, or any type of
security or transaction, withdraw or further condition this
exemption, or increase or decrease the number of buyers per-
mitted (Emphasis added).
This subdivision was inconsistent with subdivision 10 of that section,
and the Division indicated orally that it would resolve the conflict by
taking the position that Subdivision 2(c) governed. The effect was, of
course, to read Subdivision 10, out of the Act, and in 1971, with the
cooperation of the Commissioner, subdivision 2(c), was amended to
remove any reference to agency transactions with the objective of
clarifying that subdivision 10 was to be the operative provision relating
to broker-dealer agency transactions.
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
issuer sales. However, a much more comprehensive and current
source of information on corporations than found in the manuals
is provided by the reporting requirements under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.13 It would require no radical change
in the underlying philosophy of the Minnesota act to exempt from
the requirement that nonissuer transactions be registered, (i)
those securities of issuers which have securities registered
under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, (ii)
securities exempted from such registration by Section 12(g)
(2) (G) of the Exchange Act, and (iii) securities issued by invest-
ment companies registered under the Investment Company Act
of 1940.136 While the Uniform Securities Act does not follow
such an approach (utilizing for nonissuer transactions both sea-
soned security and manual exemptions) , 1 3 7 at the time the Uni-
form Act was drafted registration under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 was limited to corporations whose securities were
listed on national stock exchanges. The 1964 amendment of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 added Section 12(g), 1' 8
which provides for registration with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission by corporations of any outstanding security
held of record by more than 500 shareholders if the issuing cor-
poration has at least one million dollars in total assets. Since
1964 there has been a consistent expansion of the reporting re-
quirements for corporations registered under the 1934 Act and
recently adopted amendments to rules under the 1933 Act will re-
sult in the registration with the SEC under the 1934 Act of a num-
ber of corporations which are not required to do so pursuant
to Section 12(g). 139 The use of the standards of registration
pursuant to the 1934 Act to provide exemptions for trading
transactions for recognized securities both in the over-the-coun-
ter market and on stock exchanges has been made a part of the
securities laws of both California and Wisconsin.' 40
135. See generally Aalberg, SEC Disclosure Requirements for Cor-
porations, 26 Bus. LAw. 1223 (1971).
136. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, tit. I, 54 Stat. 789
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
137. UNIFORM SEcunrrIs ACT, § 402(6) (2).
138. Act of Aug. 20, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565.
139. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5223 (January 11, 1972 (dis-
cussing Rule 144 in which the following statement appears: "The Com-
mission . . . believes that it would be in the interest of protection of
investors for such issuers [small companies not required to register
securities under section 12(g)] to be reporting companies under the
Exchange Act, and, therefore, encourages such issuers to register securi-
ties voluntarily. .... ).
140. CAL. CORP. CODE § 25101 (1971); WIsc. STAT. § 551.23(3) (a)
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D. SECURITIES NOT SUBJECT TO REGISTRATION
Section 80.05 of the Minnesota Securities Act describes 14
classes of securities which may be sold without registration un-
der the Act. The exemption provided is only from the regis-
tration provisions of the Act, not the antifraud provisions. The
classes of securities exempted from registration under Section
80.05 fall into a pattern which is present in most Blue Sky laws
throughout the country. As Loss and Cowett point out, "when
all of the redundant and fantastically variegated phraseology of
the present statutes is disregarded, there is a surprising sim-
ilarity of basic patterns in the exemptions."'14 1 The theory ap-
parently underlying most of the exemptions found in Section
80.05 is that it would be redundant to require registration of
securities of issuers which are regulated by other governmental
bodies. The exemptions are, therefore, arranged by industry:
state and federal bank stocks (Subdivision 3), railroad and re-
lated securities (Subdivision 4), savings and loan association se-
curities (Subdivision 9), insurance company securities (Subdi-
vision 11), and securities issued or guaranteed by common car-
riers subject to federal regulation (Subdivision 13). Securi-
ties listed on the New York, American, Pacific Coast, and
Midwest Stock Exchanges are exempted pursuant to Subdivision
5. Subdivision 14 provides that the Commissioner may "by writ-
ten order or regulation" suspend or wholly revoke the exempt
status of any security or class of security exempted by this sec-
tion.
E. E x = SAEs
The provisions of the Minnesota act dealing with exemp-
tions are among its most important. Exemptions cut across both
the day-to-day trading in securities of publicly held corporations
and the activities of closely held corporations. It is perhaps in
this latter area where the impact of the Act is least understood.
The subdivisions of Section 80.06 dealing with the trading in se-
curities of publicly held corporations have been dealt with
above142 and the following discussion will center on the exemp-
tions relating to isolated sales, limited distributions, and sev-
eral related exemptions.
(1971). The concept is discussed in Gray & Rosen, Section 12(g) and
Blue Sky Laws, 20 Bus. LAw. 1075 (1965).
141. L. Loss & E. CoWET, supra note 130, at 353. The Uniform Se-
curities Act analogue to Mixx. STAT. § 80.05 is § 402(a).
142. See part II C supra.
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1. Isolated sales
The isolated sales provision of Section 80.06 (Subdivision
2(a)) is relied upon, sometimes knowingly and often unknow-
ingly, in most securities transactions within the state. Since Sec-
tion 80.07 provides that "no securities, except those exempt un-
der Section 80.05 and those sold in sales exemptions under Sec-
tion 80.06" (emphasis added) shall be offered or sold in Minne-
sota without registration, its importance to many transactions in-
volving closely held corporations is evident.
1 4 3
The central question to any consideration of the isolated
sales exemption is how many sales may be made in reliance
thereon. The vagueness of the Act's language is not unusual in
Blue Sky law. As Loss and Cowett point out with reference
to the isolated sales provisions in such laws, "indefiniteness here
is traditional and probably inevitable.' 144 However, in the Uni-
form Securities Act the exemption is made specific in that it is
limited to an offer directed to not more than 10 persons within
a 12-month period.' 45 It has been suggested that the basis for
the traditional indefiniteness in isolated sales exemptions gen-
erally is a legislative fear that a precise definition would aid
evasion of the law."" But those who wish to comply with the
law and who need specific standards by which financial trans-
actions can be carried out would benefit from more precision.
A possible compromise would be a specific statutory standard,
reserving to the Commissioner the authority to deal directly
with those who would attempt to use the exemption to effect
an unlawful distribution. 47
The test employed by the Minnesota Supreme Court in de-
termining whether or not a sale is isolated focuses on its relation
in time and purpose to other sales of the same securities by the
same person. As expressed in State v. Swenson,1 48 "[A] sale is
143. The isolated sales exemption has been expressed in substan-
tially similar language since the passage of the Act. Its constitutional-
ity was upheld against a challenge that it was void for vagueness in
1927. State v. Swenson, 172 Minn. 277, 215 N.W. 177 (1927).
144. L. Loss & E. CowETT, supra note 130, at 318.
145. UNIFORM SECURrTIEs ACT § 402(b) (9).
146. Note, supra note 120, at 1647.
147. "[T]here is no reason to believe that state securities agencies
could not also look through the form of the transactions to the sub-
stance in order to catch the unscrupulous investor, while still providing
other investors with an ascertainable standard by which they could
judge their transactions." Id. For a discussion of the analogous ex-
emption under the 1933 Act, see L. Loss, supra note 120, at 653-96.
148. 172 Minn. 277, 215 N.W. 177 (1927).
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not to be deemed an isolated sale where it bears such a relation
to other similar sales occurring sufficiently near the same time as
to constitute one of a series of associated acts for the promotion
of the same project.' 14 9 The Minnesota court has generally given
a narrow construction to the isolated sales exemption, x 0 and
the conclusion that "isolated" will generally mean "single" is
suggested by the expression of the isolated sale rule in the Massa-
chusetts case of Kneeland v. Emertson,15 1 cited in 1960 by the
Minnesota court in Anderson v. Mikel Drilling Co.: 1 5 2
[A]n "isolated" sale means one standing alone, disconnected
from any other, and "repeated and successive" mean transac-
tions undertaken and performed one after the other. We think
that two sales of securities, made one after the other within a
period of such reasonable time as to indicate that one general
purpose actuates the vendor and that the sales promote the same
aim and are not so detached and separated as to form no part
of a single plan, would be "repeated and successive transac-
tions",. 153
The Minnesota Securities Division has operated with in-
formal and varying policies as to how many sales may be made
under the exemption. Perhaps the most restrictive view has
been taken recently by the Division, appearing in proposed reg-
ulations which first came to light in 1970 (and which have not
yet been adopted or formally withdrawn). These proposed reg-
ulations would limit isolated sales, except in connection with
the organization of corporations, to
a single sale made from time to time, with sufficient time inter-
vals so that the sales do not constitute sales being made in the
course of repeated and successive sales of securities of the same
issuer. Six months is presumed to constitute the passage of a
sufficient time interval. If more than one sale is made during a
six-month period without the prior approval of the Division,
none of the sales constitute an isolated sale.154
149. Id. at 282-83, 215 N.W. at 179.
150. See, e.g., Virnig v. Smith, 252 Minn. 363. 90 N.W.2d 241 (1958).
(12 sales in short period but exemption claimed § 80.35, not § 80.06
(2) (a) ); State v. Robbins, 185 Minn. 202, 240 N.W. 456 (1932) (re-
jected argument that all sales of the same issue constituted one offense);
State v. Swenson, 172 Minn. 277, 215 N.W. 177 (1927) (10 sales within
short period); State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber, 146 Minn. 52, 177 N.W.
937 (1920) (6 sales in 22 days). But see Parr v. Canam Metals, 196
Minn. 325, 265 N.W. 287 (1936) (2 sales 14 days apart by brokerage
firm exempt). See generally Annot., 1. A.L.R.3d 614 (1965).
151. 280 Mass. 371, 183 N.E. 155 (1932).
152. 257 Minn. 487, 102 N.W.2d 293 (1960).
153. Id. at 492, 102 N.W.2d at 297.
154. Proposed regulations entitled "Guidelines for Issuers," issued
February, 1970.
1972]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
This restrictive interpretation was based on the Division's read-
ing of the important Anderson case.155
The Anderson case involved rescission claims brought by
purchasers of oil and gas leases. Three such cases against the
same defendants were consolidated for trial. A substantially
similar case had been tried and decided for the defendants in
federal district court' 56 and the state district court granted de-
fendants' summary judgment motion based on the collateral es-
toppel effect of the federal court decision. The issue before the
Minnesota Supreme Court on appeal by the plaintiffs involved
the propriety of the order of summary judgment. In the fed-
ral court case, the defendants based their defense to the claim
that they sold unregistered securities on an exemption from reg-
istration under the 1933 Act based on Section 4(2) of that act.
In the state case, the defendants argued that the sales were iso-
lated under Section 80.35 of the state act (the section cover-
ing isolated sales of oil and gas interests). On appeal, the court
held that the issue of a Section 4(2) exemption from registra-
tion under the 1933 Act was not the same as the issue of exemp-
tion from registration pursuant to Section 80.35 of the state
act and that, therefore, the state district court had improperly
applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel. In reaching this con-
clusion, the court cited Kneeland v. Emertson'5 7 and pointed
out that "whether a transaction falls within the purview of our
statutory exemption provision is determined by examining the
relation of the transactions to each other in point of time and
purpose."'158
This very limited holding does not seem to provide support
for the Division's restrictive interpretation of the isolated sales
provision. Moreover, the Division's reliance on the Anderson
opinion in issuing an interpretation under Section 80.06 (2) (a)
fails to take account of differences in language between that sec-
tion and Section 80.35, which was the section before the court
in the Anderson case, and which, as indicated above, applies
to oil or gas lands or interests. Section 80.06 (2) (a) refers to "any
isolated sales of any securities . . . such sales not being made in
the course of repeated and successive sales of securities of the
same issue," (emphasis added) while Section 80.35 states that
155. MEMORANDUM, supra note 43, at 7.
156. Collier v. Mikel Drilling Company, 183 F. Supp. 104 (D. Minn.,
1958).
157. 280 Mass. 371, 183 N.E. 155 (1932).
158. 257 Minn. at 492, 102 N.W.2d at 298.
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the oil and gas registration provisions are not appliable to "any
isolated sale not made or occurring in the course of repeated
or successive sales" (emphasis added). The operative word
is stated in the plural in Section 80.06(2) (a), while it is stated
in the singular in Section 80.35. Furthermore, the issue con-
cept which is present in Section 80.06 (2) (a) is not present in Sec-
tion 80.35. The Anderson case, then, is not an express hold-
ing on the scope of the isolated sales exemption and, in any
event, the court was not even construing that section of the
statute upon which the proposed regulations were based. To ig-
nore, as the proposed regulations do, that "sales" is in the
plural in the statute is to engage in gratuitous rewriting of the
statute by regulation. The concept of "issue" which is present
in Section 80.06 (2) (a) supports the application of the exemption
to private placements whereby several purchasers acquire secur-
ities in the same placement, often pursuant to a single purchase
agreement. 159 A determination of whether or not a particular
sale is within the exemption would appear to require not only
the application of a numbers test, but also a determination as
to whether or not the securities involved are part of the same
issue.
Earlier in this article 00 reference was made to the restric-
159. The "issue" concept arises under Sections 3(a) (11), 3(b), and
4(2) of the 1933 Act. The following factors have been cited by the SEC
as important in determining whether securities are being offered as
part of a single issue:(a) Are the offerings part of a single plan of financing?(b) Is the same class of security involved?
(c) Are the offerings made at or about the same time?(d) Is the same type of consideration to be received?(e) Are the offerings made for the same purpose?
SEC Securities Act Release No. 4434 (1961). See generally 1 L. Loss,
supra note 120, at 577-78, 591-95. In MlORm=UM, supra note 43, at
8, the following comment appears:
It appears, however, that the most reasonable interpretation of
the statutory framework at the present time would permit
sales to a limited number of investors in a private placement ef-fected at one time and not in the course of repeated and suc-
cessive sales of securities of the same issue. This interpretation
would permit a private placement to be made to finance an
issuer's immediate objective and would permit a similar privateplacement to be made at some reasonable time interval there-
after to accommodate a distinctly, different objective or financ-
ing need of the issuer. The limited distribution exemption pro-
vided in Subdivision (b) would, then, be utilized by an is-
suer for an offering of its securities over a period of time to
unrelated investors within the number restrictions provided
by the statute or by order of the Commissio to finance a
company's operations irrespective of an identifiable need for
the capital to be raised in the limited distribution.
160. See text accompanying notes 92-95 supra.
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tive impact of stringent Blue Sky regulations on the financing
of business enterprises. As expressed in the form of the stand-
ards of qualification for the registration of securities, such reg-
ulation has the effect of limiting a promoter's profit on a success-
ful venture through regulation of matters such as cheap stock,
promotional securities, warrants and options. It was pointed out
that this regulation proceeds on the assumption that fraudulent
deals have certain identifiable characteristics. By regulating
the symptoms, Blue Sky law attempts to prevent the disease.
Restrictive interpretations of isolated sales exemptions would
seem to have a similar limiting effect on business financing.
As Professor Mofsky points out,
If the promoter is forced to give up control by virtue of the
restrictions contained in the limited offering exemption or the
rules limiting promotion shares, control will shift to those per-
sons who can afford to purchase it. The regulatory system pre-
cludes the no-asset promoter from competing effectively with
investment bankers and affluent persons for control, and accord-
ingly the latter persons secure control at a lower price than
would be paid if the entrepreneur were not hindered by re-
strictive statutes and rules.161
The effect of a restrictive interpretation of the isolated sales ex-
emption will generally be to increase the shares of the enterprise
obtained by investors if it is assumed that the amount of fi-
nancing required by the promoter remains the same. In ef-
fect, fewer persons will each acquire larger shares, reducing or,
perhaps, eliminating the control of the promoter. Whether or
not this fear of loss of control is a significant one among busi-
ness promoters, of course, only can be determined by sophisti-
cated empirical study.' 62
Serious problems with interpretation of the isolated sales
exemption in Minnesota were reduced by the passage in 1969
of an amendment to the Act which became Subdivision 2(b)
of Section 80.06.163 Section 80.06 (2) (b) provided an exemption
for sales to not more than ten persons during any period of
twelve consecutive months if the seller reasonably believed
that the buyers were purchasing for investment, if no commis-
161. Mofsky, Blue Sky Restrictions on New Business Promotions,
1969 DuKE L.J. 273, 289.
162. One observer points out, with respect to the Minnesota small
businessmen interviewed by him, "owners generally appeared to be
wary of growth that could require sharing control of the firm." Ste-
venson, Equity and Long-Term Financing for Small Manufacturing
Firms in Minnesota (Small Business Administration, 1962).
163. Minn. Laws 1969, ch. 848.
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sion was paid, and if certain information was furnished to the
Securities Division. The Commissioner was granted authority
to increase or decrease the number of purchasers permitted and
to waive each of the three conditions. While Section 80.06 (2) (b)
was a helpful relief, particularly during a period when the Di-
vision was interpreting the isolated sales exemption to allow one
sale each six months, a substantial disagreement arose as to the
type of information which purchasers should obtain in transac-
tions presumably exempt under Section 80.06(2) (b).1'( In addi-
tion, the preclusion of the payment of a commission for sales
effected under this subsection seemed to be unrealistic and to
serve no regulatory purpose. Also, frequent attempts were
made to obtain administrative approval to increase the crucial
number of purchasers above ten. These dissatisfactions cul-
minated in the preparation and passage of an amendment to
the subsection, with the cooperation of the Division, which in-
creased to twenty the number of persons to whom sales could
be made, eliminated the prohibition against commissions, and
focused the information requirements on material to be sup-
plied to the Commissioner rather than to prospective pur-
chasers.1 6 5
2. Subscriptions
Another provision of Section 80.06 which poses problems is
Subdivision (6) relating to subscriptions. This subdivision ex-
empts subscriptions for securities which are conditioned ex-
pressly upon registration within one year from the date of
subscription. Subdivision (6) is the only place in the Act
where subscription agreements are covered, yet Section 301.17
of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act provides for preincor-
poration subscription agreements and contains detailed pro-
visions as to their irrevocability and other terms. This lack of
coordination between Minnesota's corporation and securities
laws results in violation of the Minnesota Securities Act when-
ever preincorporation subscription agreements are obtained and
not registered as securities or are not otherwise exempt under
164. See ME Amo u, supra note 43, at 9-12, and letter, dated
April 29, 1971, from Securities Commissioner Edward Driscoll to Rep-
resentative Otto Bang, Chairman of the Committee on Financial Insti-
tutions of the Minnesota House of Representatives. Copy on file with
the Minnesota Law Review.
165. Minn. Laws 1971, ch. 723,
19721
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the Act. Section 401 (b) (10) of the Uniform Securities Act pro-
vides an exemption for the offer or sale of preorganization sub-
scriptions to no more than ten persons. Presumably any mod-
ification in this area should be consistent with the isolated sales
exemption and with Section 80.06 (2) (b).
3. Corporate Acquisitions
The regulation of corporate acquisitions under the Act is
primarily the function of Section 80.06(15). In effect, Subdivi-
sion (15) provides an exemption for asset acquisitions for statu-
tory mergers or consolidations if the Commissioner "has been
furnished with a general description of the transaction and
with such other information as he may prescribe by rules and
regulations." No rules or regulations have been issued pursuant
to Subdivision 15, and the practice generally seems to be to send
a description of the transaction to the Division, which currently
is issuing a form of "no-action" letter in connection with asset
acquisitions or statutory mergers. Thus, reorganizations such as
mergers and asset acquisitions falling under Sections 368(a)
(1) (A) and (C) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 are ex-
empt. However, stock acquisitions (including "B" reorganiza-
tions as defined in Section 368(a) (1) (B) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954) are not exempt under Subdivision (15) and, un-
less an exemption can be found pursuant to Subdivision (2) of
Section 80.06, registration is presumably necessary. 00
III. CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion focuses on the provisions of the
Minnesota Securities Act related to registration of securities.
There are many other areas covered by the Act, such as reme-
dies, jurisdiction, and enforcement provisions, all of which pose
problems similar to those existing in connection with the regis-
tration provisions. But it is the Act's registration provisions
which have been at the center of securities regulation in Minne-
sota because the paternalistic philosophy underlying the Act re-
quires the Securities Commissioner to make a value judgment
on a great number of securities issues.
166. The Act's pattern thus is superficially similar to the federal
pattern which has emerged around Rule 133 under the 1933 Act. See
C. SCHNEIDER, SEC CONSEQUENCES OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, chs. 2
and 3 (1971). See also Cowett, Reorganizations, Consolidations, Merg-
ers and Related Corporate Events under the Blue Sky Laws, 13 Bus.
LAW. 418 (part I), 760 (part II) (1958).
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There are at least four areas in which the Act's registra-
tion provisions seem defective. First, the actual securities regis-
tration provisions pose procedural problems. The distinction
between registration for sales to original purchasers and second-
ary market trading has proven confusing and unfair in appli-
cation. Coordination with federal registration, when available,
comes as a matter of administrative grace. Second, the general
language of Section 80.08 has spawned a mass of regulations re-
lating to standards which may not be the most effective way to
protect the public's interest. Such regulations are ambiguous
and uneven in application. Their adoption was not based on a
demonstrated need and their impact on business growth has not
been considered. Third, the Act's vagueness in matters such as
standards for registration and key exemptions has resulted in
the Commissioner of Securities being vested with discretion
almost as broad as the Act. Correspondingly, the financial com-
munity has been exposed to radical shifts in philosophy as ad-
ministrators change. While administrative flexibility is an es-
sential and desirable part of the Blue Sky regulatory struc-
ture, in the absence of definite statutory standards such flexi-
bility can evolve into arbitrariness. Finally, the exemption pat-
tern is simply not rational. The Act applies to situations where
its application serves no regulatory purpose, it leaves whole in-
dustries free from regulation, and it is ambiguous in areas where
ambiguity serves no regulatory purpose but where certainty
would further legitimate business activities.
That states should regulate their securities markets by re-
strictive registration requirements has been assumed with
little dissent ever since the Kansas Act was first passed. The
Uniform Securities Act was an effort to bring uniformity out
of chaos but did not purport to change the conventional wis-
dom of merit regulation. Recently, however, the soundness of
the basic concept of merit regulation has begun to be challenged.
The relevant question now is whether the aims of public pro-
tection and sound capital markets better can be served by an
emphasis on strong antifraud enforcement rather than on re-
strictive merit regulations. The possible negative effect of re-
strictive merit regulation on entrepreneurship and new busi-
ness development cannot be ignored any more than can the ex-
istence of a vigorous system of federal securities regulation.
Both factors are important for Minnesota. The fact of federal
securities regulation emphasizes the inefficiency and wasteful-
ness of duplicate regulation. The importance of access to the
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capital markets for the development of small business em-
phasizes the desirability of looking to the needs of our own state
in constructing for it an appropriate system of securities regu-
lation.
